IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION

IN RE: AQUEOUS FILM-FORMING * MDL No. 2:18-mn-2873

FOAMS PRODUCTS LIABILITY *

LITIGATION * February 2, 2024

TRANSCRIPT OF FAIRNESS HEARING OF THE 3M SETTLEMENT IN THE CASE OF THE CITY OF CAMDEN VS. 3M, ET AL. BEFORE THE HONORABLE RICHARD M. GERGEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE, presiding

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Karen E. Martin, RMR, CRR US District Court District of South Carolina

1	Friday, February 2, 2024
2	(WHEREUPON, court was called to order at 10:14 AM).
3	THE COURT: Good morning. Please be seated.
4	ATTORNEYS IN UNISON: Good morning, Your Honor.
5	THE COURT: Okay. This is the fairness hearing
6	in the City of Camden vs. 3M. 2:18-2873 is the MDL
7	number, Case No. 2:23-3147.
8	Could counsel who will be speaking for the
9	plaintiff identify himself or herself for the record,
10	please?
11	MR. SUMMY: Good morning, Your Honor. Scott
12	Summy.
13	THE COURT: Very good. Thank you, Mr. Summy.
14	MR. DOUGLAS: Good morning, Your Honor. Gary
15	Douglas.
16	MR. NAPOLI: Good morning, Your Honor. Paul
17	Napoli.
18	MS. FEGAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Elizabeth
19	Fegan.
20	PROFESSOR KLONOFF: Good morning, Your Honor.
21	Bob Klonoff.
22	MR. RICE: I don't anticipate speaking, Your
23	Honor. Joe Rice.
24	THE COURT: But you just did.
25	MR. LONDON: I am going to follow Mr. Rice.

1	Mr. London.
2	THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. London.
3	For 3M?
4	MR. BULGER: Good morning, Your Honor. Rich
5	Bulger.
6	MR. HIRSCH: Good morning, Your Honor. Sam
7	Hirsch.
8	MR. OLSEN: Good morning, Your Honor. Mike
9	Olsen.
10	THE COURT: Mr. Olsen, good to see you again.
11	We've missed you.
12	The objector from the Cities of Vancouver and
13	Dupont Washington.
14	MR. KRAY: Good morning, Your Honor. Jeff Kray.
15	THE COURT: Good to see you again, sir.
16	And the objector from Broward County, Florida.
17	MS. HARROD: Good morning, Your Honor. Rene
18	Harrod.
19	THE COURT: Thank you. Okay.
20	Let me go through the process and procedures
21	we're going to follow today in handling this fairness
22	hearing. We'll initially have class counsel explain the
23	major features of the proposed settlement and explain how
24	the settlement meets all the legal requirements and is
25	fair, reasonable, and adequate.

3M counsel will then make any additional comments that they may wish. I would say that to the extent there's any disagreement with something plaintiff's counsel's has described in this settlement, I think this is the time to speak up because parties are relying, obviously, on these representations.

After we hear these initial presentations, we will hear from the objectors who have given us written notice that they wish to be heard at this fairness hearing. And I will -- we will initially hear from the Cities of Vancouver and Dupont. And then we'll hear from Broward County, Florida.

After that, class counsel and 3M will have a chance to respond to those objections. And thereafter, the Court will take the matter under advisement.

Are there any questions in terms of procedure from any of the counsel?

(There was no response.)

THE COURT: If not, Mr. Summy, I'll be glad to hear from you, sir.

MR. SUMMY: May it please the Court? Your Honor, Scott Summy. I'm here on behalf of class counsel, co-leads, and the PEC. For purposes of our presentation today, I'm going to cover the major features of the settlement. Mr. Douglas is going to cover the Jiffy Lube

factors and Rule 23(e). Ms. Fegan will briefly cover Rule 23 and the legal requirements there and may also touch on notice. And then at the end, Your Honor, we would like to have Professor Klonoff give some observations in our closing remarks.

THE COURT: Very good.

MR. SUMMY: Your Honor, we are privileged to be here once again to discuss with the Court another historic settlement that has occurred in this MDL. And this will truly mark a milestone in this MDL. And we are honored to be here before you today, Your Honor.

On behalf of class counsel, the PEC, and the co-leads, we are here requesting final approval of the 3M PFAS Public Water System settlement. As this Court is aware, PFAS, known as the forever chemicals, is plaguing public water systems across this country. There are hundreds and thousands of water systems that have detections of PFAS. In fact, Your Honor, in July of 2023, the USGS, the US Geological Service, concluded that approximately 45 percent of those drinking tap water in this country there is a detection of PFAS. Fortunately, this settlement with 3M is going to go a long way in remedying that situation.

But, Your Honor, before I get into the major features, I do want to take just a moment to talk about

how we got here. Because as this Court is aware, we just passed the five year anniversary of this MDL.

THE COURT: We didn't have a birthday party.

MR. SUMMY: Or a cocktail party. And over the last five years, Your Honor, just to give a bit of a summary, class counsel, co-leads, the PEC, through all of its committees have logged 431,000 hours. We've coded and reviewed over 37 million pages of documents in discovery. We have conducted nearly 200 depositions. We have retained and worked with over 30 expert witnesses. We've briefed and argued multiple legal motions, including the famous government contractor defense motion which was a huge issue in this case as the Court is aware. And I know the Court spent a lot of time on those issues.

We've worked --

THE COURT: I've never felt neglected by y'all.

MR. SUMMY: We've worked on a bellwether process that started with ten water provider cases, did discovery on those and then narrowed them to three and narrowed them to one, which was the City of Stuart case. We spent just under \$20 million in out-of-pocket costs that relate to 3M's share of the expenses. It has been a Herculean effort by a number of lawyers in this courtroom that have spent their last five years devoted their lives to this cause.

Your Honor, I want to touch a little bit on the history of the negotiations with 3M. They started in April of 2021, nearly three years ago. And while we made progress, we didn't get real true traction until this Court appointed Judge Lain Phillips and his team, Clay Cogman and Andrew Green, to assist the parties in reaching a resolution.

Once he was appointed and we started through the mediation process, things got serious. And I will tell you that I tried to go back and determine how many mediation sessions, either by streaming or in person, we had. And the best I could come up with by way of estimate is about 50 different sessions.

I can remember working numerous Sundays along with my co-leads, Michael London and Paul Napoli. We spent a tremendous amount of time negotiating with 3M and working with the mediators. I can in fact remember one night where we were at Tom Perrelli's Chicago office and left at 2:30 in the morning. And the reason I remember that is there was a big clock sitting outside the door as we walked out. And I remember we all took a picture of it saying can you believe this? So it has been a long, long road.

I also want to commend the lawyers who represent 3M. They worked like crazy, like we did, for this

settlement. And Mr. Perrelli is not here today, but he was key in this settlement, along with Mr. Bulger, Mr. Hirsch, and Mr. Olsen. They worked tirelessly to work with us in trying to solve an issue that is plaguing this country's water systems.

THE COURT: I recall on the evening before the bellwether I was on the phone with all of you working out these last very complicated details.

MR. SUMMY: There is no question, Your Honor.

And that occurred last summer because this settlement occurred on June 22nd of 2023. And the Court was extremely involved all the way up until the start of the bellwether trial which, fortunately, we avoided.

THE COURT: And let me just say because

Mr. Perrelli is not here. I know the key role he played
in facilitating this extremely complicated -- taking
nothing away from defense counsel, but I think they all
know just how critical Mr. Perrelli was in making this
thing happen.

MR. SUMMY: I had conversations with him seven days a week, all hours of the day. And I will say that he is a gifted lawyer who, in effect, came up with a lot of the concepts. He helped come up with a lot of the concepts that are in the settlement that I'll talk about today.

THE COURT: And let me just say, one of the observations I have is that the PEC took -- felt like they were dealing with someone they could deal with in Mr. Perrelli. And defendants felt like they could -- it was someone they could deal with with you. And I think that leadership has played a critical role in making this happen.

MR. SUMMY: Yes. And I appreciate that, Your Honor. And I do agree that Mr. Perrelli was -- he wasn't here in the beginning, but he came in -- he was hired by 3M to come in and assist with this settlement process. And he was someone, and I think my co-leads would agree, he was someone that we could talk to and deal with. And he was a great solver of issues. And we never got into a position where lines were drawn where we couldn't go forward. So he was a pleasure to deal with.

Your Honor, at the end of the day, we reached a settlement in the amount of 10.5 billion to 12.5 billion. And in a little bit, I'm going to explain why we keep saying 10.5 to 12.5 and how that works. But make no mistake about it, this is the largest drinking water settlement in American history. Dupont, which we had a hearing on earlier, is the second.

These funds are going to assist public water systems across the United States in dealing with impending

state and federal regulations. And at the end of the day, the beneficiary of that is the public of the United States.

I'm going to move into the features of the settlement. And where I want to start is with the class definition.

As the Court is aware and the class members and the lawyers in this courtroom are aware, there are two phases. There is a Phase One and a Phase Two. And these are public water systems that are in the class definition. And the difference between Phase One and Phase Two is in Phase One, the public water systems had detected PFAS chemicals before the date of the settlement, June 22nd, 2023. Phase Two is for public water systems that have not detected it but are required to test under UCMR5. And I'll be talking about UCMR5. But in the end in this particular settlement with these class definitions there are approximately 12,000 public water systems that meet these definitions.

The first thing I want to talk about is one of the things that we attempted to do, which is we wanted to deal with not only the litigation in the settlement, but we wanted to time that up with the regulatory requirements that public water systems faced and they're facing those today.

The first one is the EPA announced in March of 2023 last year drinking water standards for PFOA and PFOS and a hazard index for some additional PFAS chemicals. These are the strictest drinking water standards in American history. It is anticipated that these will become final over the next several months. And public water systems across the country will have three years to come into compliance once those are adopted. So we had to take that into account in the timing of how we set the settlement up.

The second thing I want to mention is what the EPA did in 2021 wherein they adopted UCMR5. In UCMR5, it requires water systems that serve 3300 people or more to test for PFAS chemicals over the next three years starting last year.

So that testing is going on. And we know that some folks have already tested and they've detected it and they're in Phase One. And we know others will be testing. And if they find it, they'll be in Phase Two. And even if they are just testing, they are in Phase Two. So we had to match up these regulatory requirements in the settlement, which we did in all of our timing and concepts.

Now I want to get into this variable amount of the settlement. And before I do so, the one thing I want

to just discuss briefly is just the amount, even if we just take the 10.5 billion. We already know it's the largest drinking water settlement. But just to put it in perspective a little bit, Congress last year in February passed the infrastructure bill. And in that bill they basically put \$10 billion to help communities across the country deal with emerging contaminants. What that means is is there are other chemicals besides PFAS that public water systems deal with. These funds can be accessed for There's only about five billion of that that is that. earmarked for PFAS. And most of that is going to disadvantaged communities. And while that is a very good thing, it helps put perspective into what 3M has put on the table for this problem. The 3M settlement, even at 10.5, actually eclipses what the federal government has It's that powerful. done.

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The other thing that I want to talk about is just to give a glimpse into the negotiations and the amount that we negotiated. Because I am convinced that we negotiated maximum dollar that we could get out of 3M. And the reason I say that is because when we were in these negotiations, we were constantly looking at and studying the financial condition of 3M. At that time the market cap of the entire company was \$53 billion. They were also facing ear plug litigation, which they eventually resolved

for 6.5 billion. And they're also facing other PFAS claims.

And we all know, and we've talked about in this courtroom before, the PFAS problem as a whole is larger than all of the companies put together. And so it was important that class members realize that the only way this was going to work is you have to take less for the greater good.

THE COURT: We had a discussion, I'm sure you recall this, some years ago in which I made the observation that even if the plaintiffs maxed out and won every issue, there was not enough money among the defendants to pay for the damages alleged by the plaintiffs, and that y'all needed, I told you at the time, I'm sitting here and I've got the best lawyers in America on both sides here, but you need to at least step back and together go to Congress to explain this problem. Because as significant as this settlement is, it is -- several objectors, you know, made the point, there isn't -- it doesn't pay for the whole damage. And you don't claim it does.

MR. SUMMY: That's correct.

THE COURT: Because it just -- and, you know, I found it very interesting and I read with a great deal of care the provisions of this settlement which discussed in

detail the real risk that this company could be pushed into bankruptcy. And I don't think, you can correct me, I don't think it's in the interests of anyone to push 3M into bankruptcy.

MR. SUMMY: It's truly not. And, Your Honor, you talked about it before that none of these companies can pay the full amount of damages. And the one -- the number one reason that I heard why people opted out is because they weren't getting a hundred cents on the dollar.

THE COURT: I've heard that as well. And it is true.

MR. SUMMY: And we just endorsed it. We would say, you're right, but you have to look at it from a more global perspective. Because what is the alternative? Do you really want to end up in bankruptcy court? And I can tell you that one of the defendants in this case has gone bankrupt as a result of PFAS.

THE COURT: And it very much disrupted y'all's trial strategy.

MR. SUMMY: It not only disrupted the trial, but we have been dealing with that bankruptcy, the PEC and the co-leads. And it is not a process that we would like to take these public water systems down. It is inefficient. It is costly. And it takes forever. And you don't get --

you get pennies on the dollar in the end. It is not a place to be.

So this settlement is truly in the best interest of these public water systems. Because even though you're not getting a hundred cents on the dollar, you are taking less for the greater good, and you are in a much better position to stay in this settlement and get this money than you are -- than the alternative.

And it's something that we're proud of. It's something that we hope folks took into account or that they will take into account as they make decisions whether or not to come back in. Because it's important.

And fortunately, I will say when you look at it as a whole, the overwhelming majority of class members certainly understood this because it's something we worked very hard on. And they did stay in the settlement. And they did agree to take less for the greater good.

The next thing I want to get into, Your Honor, is this slide that's on the table. Because it gets into, you know, how -- is it the 10.5 or is it the 12.5? And I just want to explain how that works.

One of the things that we had a lot of discussion about with 3M is the Phase Twos. Because the Phase Twos, you don't know exactly how many are going to detect it in the end. And so we went back and forth on

the money about how to deal with that. And we came up with a creative way in which to take that into account, that unknown factor of how many Phase Twos will actually detect PFAS. And what we did is we came up with a floor and a cap. And this is in Section 6.8.9 and 10 of the Master Settlement Agreement.

And the way it works is is that 6.875, which is 55 percent of the 12.5, was placed into Phase One. And that will be allocated to the Phase One class members leaving a guarantee of 3.625 that will go to Phase Two with a cap of 5.625 that could go to Phase Two.

So the way it works, if you see in the middle of the screen July 2026, we know that the UCMR5 testing is '23, '24, and 2025. Once that closes down, the EPA is going to have final numbers. And of course, class members that are doing that testing will already know. They will have until July 2026 to put in a claim form for those who have detected it into the claims facility. At that time the claims administrator and the special master will take everything that has been submitted by the Phase Twos and they will calculate what would they have gotten if they were a Phase One using the exact same allocation formula that we're going to talk about.

Once that number is determined, if that number comes in below 3.625, then 3.625 will be paid. If it

comes in between those two numbers, 3.625 and 5.625, 3M will pay that number. If it comes in above 5.625, 3M will pay 5.625.

However, one of the things that we worked with 3M very hard to do is we came up with what we call the great equalizer clause. And that clause is Section 6n.8.11. And what that clause does is it says if after we calculate the Phase Two values it comes in under that 3.625 or it comes in above the 5.625, an adjustment will be made because of the payment schedule. The payment schedule, which is paying the money out over time, allows adjustments to be made to create complete equity between Phase One and Phase Two. We think that this is a very good way to solve this issue. It's creative and it works because of the payment schedule.

And I'm going to talk just a minute about this payment schedule. I've got it up on the screen. And as we know in the payment schedule, Phase Ones will be paid out through 2033. Phase Twos will be paid out through 2036. Now, the beautiful thing about the payment schedule is it allowed us to get more money from 3M. Because allowing them to pay it out allowed them to commit more dollars to this issue.

The second thing is is one of the objectors, and I can't remember who, raised the issue of, well, paying it out over time increases the bankruptcy risk. We disagree.

We can it actually helps on that issue because it allows
them to pay it out over time as they continue to make
money.

The third thing the payment schedule does --

THE COURT: It's interesting, one of the controversies in some settlements where the defendant continues to function but is arguably creating real societal harm there is sort of this those injured are benefiting from an ongoing injury of others, the opioid settlement and so forth.

MR. SUMMY: Yes.

THE COURT: And no criticism, it is a complicated set of factors you have to consider. But that's really not the situation here. 3M is not in the PFAS business any further.

MR. SUMMY: That is correct. Your Honor, they've gotten out of it. They've announced that and they've gotten out of it. And as this Court knows, they actually got out of the fire foam PFAS business just at the turn of the century at 2000.

THE COURT: And the so-called forever chemicals.

MR. SUMMY: That's correct.

THE COURT: You know, one of the concerns and I shared it with counsel was that if you forced 3M to trial,

and there are certainly -- we all recognize the potential for devastating verdicts, it will simply put 3M into bankruptcy. There won't be -- and what will happen, who knows, right?

MR. SUMMY: Right.

THE COURT: Mr. Summy, I don't know how much experience you have in getting a verdict and having a defendant in bankruptcy. It is no pleasure.

MR. SUMMY: I've had the pleasure of being in bankruptcy court, I'd say the displeasure of being in bankruptcy court in several times in several large cases.

And I'm just telling you, you don't want to be there.

THE COURT: And you know what I found as a litigator was that I always associated bankruptcy counsel. Because the internal logic of bankruptcy is so different from every other area of law. And if you don't know -- if you don't understand bankruptcy law, your instincts about what the outcome would be and how an issue is resolved is often upside down.

MR. SUMMY: It truly is. And it's -- you're also dealing in a world where, you know, your claim, your individual claim is just not going to get dealt with.

You're in there with the masses. And it's just a terrible process. It's not where you'd want to be. I think you'd rather be here where you've got some certainty and you've

got a chance to get real dollars without a trial. And we're going to talk about some of the defenses you're going to avoid here in a minute.

But the other thing that we like about this structure is it actually matches up really well with what is facing water providers. Because the way we structured it is in both Phase One and Phase Two, a big chunk of the money is coming early in the first two years of each Phase One and Phase Two to help with the infrastructure costs that we know public water systems are facing. And then it gets paid out over time to help systems deal with their annual operation and maintenance costs. So we were able to match these payments up with the need, the active -- the needs in the real world of a public water system that is going to put treatment on to their water sources.

So we think that the payment schedule works really well. We think that it also -- it allows for more money to be paid because it's allowing them to pay it out over time.

Talking about bankruptcy, Your Honor, one of the things that we're all so very proud of and is certainly a feature of the settlement and that is that we built in in Section 12.7 of the MSA, we built in some bankruptcy protection provisions for those who are in the class. And I'll just highlight a few of those.

One is 3M is restricted from engaging or spending large, massive expenditures that would put these payments at risk. And that's important to the class.

The second thing is is if in the event they did go bankrupt, there is protection because the class members in that bankruptcy would be scheduled as liquidated, non-contingent, and undisputed. These are --

THE COURT: How does that compare to people who opt-out?

MR. SUMMY: The people who opt-out, unfortunately, will not receive these protections and they will be listed as unsecured creditors. And if you know anything about bankruptcy, if you're an unsecured creditor, you're in there with the rest of the world who may be a creditor to 3M. And so you don't have the protections that you have if you were in the class, which you are receiving as a benefit of this settlement.

THE COURT: I recall towards the end this is a real area of which y'all worked hard to building these protections. Because you've never been casual about the risk that this could be the outcome. Nobody wants it.

MR. SUMMY: That's right.

THE COURT: But there may be forces outside your control that may produce this. And I just -- for -- I think we all recognize that part of the fairness hearing

is an audience with the opt-outs, right?

MR. SUMMY: Right, sure.

THE COURT: Many of whom are in this room.

MR. SUMMY: Sure.

THE COURT: And some who are, you know, who are listening online. And I think the danger is -- you know, I've had a lot of pushback from individual parties in this case, defendants in particular, saying, you know, I wish my motion to dismiss or my issue could be heard right now. And we've got, I don't know, thousands of cases, 20,000 plaintiffs. And something gets sacrificed. The good for defendants is they're not in before 675 fellow judges litigating this, which by itself would be ruinous. Right?

MR. SUMMY: Right.

THE COURT: But I think for folks who say I can do better myself, we've -- you know, we've talked a bit about that. I'm not turning these cases over to my colleagues around the country any time soon. We've got lots of issues, lots of parties, lots of questions that need to be resolved first. So there's going to be a considerable delay. And for the lawyer who says I can do better than Gary Douglas has as the only guy living whose tried one of these.

MR. SUMMY: Right.

THE COURT: And I can do better than that. And

if they succeed and they push 3M into bankruptcy, there's going to be a high price to pay for everybody who is out in the wilderness.

MR. SUMMY: There is no doubt, Your Honor. And that harkens back to the taking less for the greater good and avoiding all of this. And, you know, I think that there could also be, if that happens, a lot of regret by opt-outs who may not have recognized the realities of all of these things.

THE COURT: What's the old bird in the hand worth versus in the bush, right? You know, those of us who litigated major claims always recognized one of our risks was that the defendant on a great case didn't have the capacity to pay the freight, right? So you were confronted of taking less than a hundred cents on the dollar not because your case wasn't strong but because the defendant wasn't sufficiently strong to pay it.

MR. SUMMY: Right.

THE COURT: And I mean, that's just part of a reality in the litigation world that it is rare to find defendants with the capacity to fully satisfy major verdicts. And, you know, 3M is an iconic company. They're a great company. They've done tremendous things. But it does not have the capacity to pay these damages.

MR. SUMMY: Correct. Correct, Your Honor. And

that's why truly this settlement is in the best interests of everyone. It provides that protection if the worst happens, which we hope it doesn't. We hope that 3M thrives actually so that we can obtain these dollars for these systems. But for those in the class, they at least have the insurance of this bankruptcy protection. It's one of the key features and one of the reasons that folks should be in this thing.

Your Honor, the next thing I want to cover is baseline testing. This is a concept that I think we talked about in Dupont, but it works a little differently here and I'll explain why.

Baseline testing is a concept we came up with because if you've ever been involved in trying to settle water cases in the United States, what happens every time is the defendant comes in and says, okay, I'll pay you X dollars, but I want you to release all of your water sources, even the ones that are un-hit. Because, you know, you've got a city that has ten drinking water wells, five are hit, five are not. Defendant says I'll pay you for the five, but you have to release all ten. We fought hard to fight back on that. And we said we don't want to release all ten.

So we came up with -- and the defendants always said, well, wait a second. The other five might be

contaminated. You haven't tested them. So we came up with a concept of baseline testing, which in effect requires class members to test all their water sources now. And then you establish a baseline.

And what happens is is using our example of the ten drinking water wells, if you do baseline testing, you'll get paid on the five. And if the five that are not hit, you've done the baseline testing, you get to reserve that claim through 2030. And if they get hit, you get to come back into the supplemental fund.

Remember in Dupont the way that worked is is if you baseline tested the five that weren't hit, you didn't release them. But you had to go back after them if you find it. Here, you don't have to do that. You can come right back into the supplemental fund.

And when I get to the supplemental fund, I'll discuss that. But we've actually put some additional money than we did in Dupont and additional percentage in the supplemental fund to account for just this issue. So it's a real benefit.

Another benefit is that we have set aside \$104 million for Phase Two to test. And the reason is that we know Phase Twos are going through the UCMR5 testing obligations. But under UCMR5, you only have to test one time in your water system. So we've added

additional funds here so that folks can test all their water sources. That way they will comply with baseline testing. They'll be able to make a claim for anything that has a detection. And then anything that doesn't have a detection, they're set in case a detection appears before the end of 2030.

THE COURT: Are they in Phase Two if they were detected later?

MR. SUMMY: So what happens is if they detected already, they're in Phase One.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SUMMY: Even though they haven't detected in all their water sources.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SUMMY: But what happens is is that if you comply with baseline testing, you get to come back into the action fund if you find it later.

THE COURT: In Phase One.

MR. SUMMY: That's correct. You go into the supplemental fund. And the same thing, it works the same way with Phase Twos. Let's say when you do your testing for Phase Twos, you'll be able to make your claim in 2027 after we get through the UCMR5 period. If you've done this baseline testing, if you have particular water sources that weren't hit originally but get hit, there's a

supplemental fund for Phase Two as well. So it is a huge benefit and solved a lot of issues for us in the settlement because it dealt with this what do we do with the un-hit water source problem.

The next thing I want to talk about, Your Honor, is just the objective allocation procedure. As this Court is aware, we've talked about it several times in live court. But this took nearly two years to develop. It was one of those things that we spent a lot of time on because we built -- you know, we built a conceptual model where we were trying to determine, all right, how do we allocate this money? And when we make little changes, we've got to make sure that it's completely objective.

And what it does is is that you have all kind of public water systems across the country. And someone says, well, I'm going to use GAC filtration, which is granular activated carbon, or I'm going to use reverse osmosis, or I'm going to use ion exchange to deal with my particular water sources. So we had to take that into account.

So what we came up with with experts is is it doesn't matter what you decide individually you want your treatment to be. The way the allocation model works is you basically put in two factors that no matter what your treatment decisions are, these two factors are the key to

relevant things that you will use and your engineers will use in coming up with your treatment; and that is, your flow rate, how much water is coming through the water source that it has to be dealt with and treated; and your PFAS score, which is a combination of what your concentration is.

And what the model will do, and we were very fortunate here, because in March of last year, the EPA came out with cost curve numbers for treatment for PFAS. And so what our experts did is is they took those cost curves. They put them into a model. And then what you do is you take you flow rate, and you take your PFAS score -- and again, on your PFAS score, we give you the benefit of the doubt. You get to take your highest score, your highest concentration you've ever found giving you your best day. And that's placed in the model with the EPA cost curves and it will submit an allocated amount for each water source that is contaminated or has a detection.

So back to our example, you'll get five awards in the system that has ten wells and five are hit. You'll get five awards, one for each one that has a detection.

The next thing is we've also given some bonuses to class members that have certain issues. For example, if you were a litigant, you filed a case and made this settlement, you attributed to this settlement happening,

you're getting a bonus on your score, you're getting a multiplier.

If you were a bellwether, you're also getting a multiplier because you had to undergo the issue of producing all your documents, putting your witnesses up for deposition, et cetera. So you're getting a bonus for that.

Probably the most important bonus though is is that if one of your water sources is currently above the proposed federal standard of four parts per trillion or any state standard, you're getting a very large bonus. And the reason is is because those folks have no choice but to treat. They will have to treat to come into compliance. And so that is taken into account in the allocation procedures.

We're very proud of the allocation procedures. And I will say that with respect to 3M, they actually dug into these allocation procedures in a very detailed fashion, particularly Rich Bulger and Sam Hirsch. They worked with us very closely. They had experts and they dug into the allocation procedures because they wanted them to be extremely fair. I had I can't tell you how many calls with these guys, and we got it to a point where everyone was satisfied. This is the best, objective way to do it. And I think Mr. Hirsch even told me it was the

best thing he'd ever seen. So it's very good.

An additional thing that we're proud of is the special needs fund and the supplemental fund. The special needs fund is in essence a separate fund from the action fund. The action fund is where the allocation procedures will take place. But we created a separate fund that 45 days after the claims facility opens, you can apply for additional monies. And this is monies beyond what you're getting compensated for for your treatment.

And I'm just going to give you a few examples, Your Honor. One is some of the folks that we heard from we had to purchase -- we had to shut down wells and purchase supplemental water. They spent money on buying supplemental water. Some folks had to shut down wells and drill new wells. Some people had to relocate old wells. So these are some of the things that were sort of emergency --

THE COURT: I recall some had lakes they could no longer use as a water source.

MR. SUMMY: That is correct. That is absolutely correct.

THE COURT: That would be another example.

MR. SUMMY: Yes, that is another example. And if you spent money in one of these unique circumstances, you can apply for this special needs fund. And we have

put in both Phase One and Phase Two, we've put five percent of the settlement funds into the special needs fund. There is going to be a lot of money to deal with these situations.

The other thing, and I talked about it, is the supplemental fund. In Dupont, we put five percent in the supplemental fund. Here we put seven percent in the supplemental fund. The reason we put additional money in here is because of the difference that I described earlier. Because you also are going to have in this settlement water sources that are not contaminated today but they're being released. But if they become contaminated, they can come straight into the supplemental fund.

The other reason for the supplemental fund is we know that circumstances change, especially when it comes to pollution. One, you may have a system that's below the standard today, or a water source, but that water source goes above the standard later.

Second, the reverse of that is, you may have the same contamination tomorrow that you have today in a water source, but the standard in your state came down and now you're above it. If that happens, you can come back into the supplemental fund and get additional money to help you with those particular water sources.

Now I want to get into some of the defenses.

And Mr. Douglas is going to get into even -- get into this even in more detail. But I do want to talk --

THE COURT: Don't take his thunder.

MR. SUMMY: I'm not going to take it away. But one of the things that's very important is, I think that is underappreciated by opt-outs, is the obligation to prove causation in these cases. We call it often product identification. You've got to show, if you opt-out and you pursue 3M, you've got to show that it's their PFAS that's in your particular water source.

And I will say, just doing some analysis on this, and this is disturbing to me, there are approximately 25 percent of the opt-outs that do not have PFOS in our data in their water system. PFOS is one of the signature chemicals that was made by 3M. And it is disturbing to me that you would opt-out of this settlement without the obvious existence of PFOS in your water system.

THE COURT: There is some branch PFOA I think?

MR. SUMMY: Yeah. So what I was going to say is it doesn't mean you don't have any 3M product, because they did make PFOA that was branched. But the only way that you could determine that is you're going to have to do specialized testing. That's expensive.

1	THE COURT: But the bulk of what 3M produced was
2	PFOS, correct?
3	MR. SUMMY: That's correct.
4	THE COURT: So I think the branched PFOA is a
5	relatively small percentage. Am I right about that?
6	MR. SUMMY: You are. Certainly, you can find
7	it, but PFOS certainly overwhelms that. And so I'm just
8	talking sort of, you know, at a baseline level if you
9	haven't done the testing to show you've got branched PFOA.
10	THE COURT: Help me with that. I think y'all
11	gave me some numbers in the Dupont settlement using the
12	City of Stuart
13	MR. SUMMY: Yes.
14	THE COURT: because y'all really did a deep
15	dive. Do you recall how those allocations worked? As I
16	recall, the branched PFOA was a pretty low number.
17	MR. SUMMY: Yeah. And I think, and Mr. Douglas
18	has that slide and he's going to cover it, but from my
19	recollection is that the PFOS was like 87 percent.
20	THE COURT: That's what I remember.
21	MR. SUMMY: And the branched PFOA was the small
22	percentage.
23	THE COURT: Like 6 percent.
24	MR. SUMMY: Like around 6 percent.
25	THE COURT: Mr. Douglas?

MR. DOUGLAS: 6.7 percent exactly, Your Honor. 1 2 MR. SUMMY: Good memory, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Well, I have nightmares at night. 4 So I guess your point is if you've got 25 percent opting 5 out with no PFOS, they have about, you know, a, what, 93 percent chance they don't have any? 6 7 MR. SUMMY: Correct. And that's why I'm raising 8 it, Your Honor. Because when we looked at it, you know, 9 sometimes people opt-out because maybe they feel like 10 their neighbor's opting out or whatever. But it has to be 11 more than that. You actually have to dig into here and 12 look at your chemistry. Because if you are staying out 13 and you want to pursue 3M, you may have opted out and don't have their chemicals in your water. 14 15 THE COURT: We had this come up in Dupont. 16 Because when we got to the bottom of Dupont's actual 17 contribution to the problem was smaller than I think y'all 18 thought at the beginning. 19 MR. SUMMY: Right. 20 And you had people opting out who, THE COURT: 21 statistically, the odds were overwhelming they had no 22 Dupont. 23 MR. SUMMY: That is correct. 24 And they opted out. THE COURT: 25 MR. SUMMY: And I'd hate to be the Right.

1 lawyer later who is having to explain that. So we'd like 2 to get this on the record and out there now because there 3 is still a chance if you have opted out of 3M and you don't have these chemicals, you may want to get back in. 4 5 THE COURT: Well, if it's one in four, have you 6 told those parties this result? 7 MR. SUMMY: It's interesting, Your Honor. Ι 8 just discovered this getting ready for this hearing 9 because, just on a whim, I thought, you know what, maybe 10 we should look at this and we discovered it. And one of 11 the things that we talked about is maybe we should reach 12 out to the ones that I'm identifying here --13 THE COURT: I think you should. 14 MR. SUMMY: -- and just notify them that, hey, 15 you can do what you want, but be aware. 16 THE COURT: You know, there's a way to analyze 17 something at 30,000 feet. 18 MR. SUMMY: Right. 19 But you guys have been down in the THE COURT: 20 weeds. 21 MR. SUMMY: Correct. 22 THE COURT: And it's just a lot more complicated 23 than it looks. 24 MR. SUMMY: Right. 25 THE COURT: I mean, to the extent that

Karen E. Martin, RMR, CRR
US District Court
District of South Carolina

25 percent, if they've got PFAS, they've got likely a telomer product --

MR. SUMMY: That's correct.

THE COURT: -- which we're still litigating.

MR. SUMMY: That's correct.

THE COURT: Right? So they haven't given up maybe the claim, if they have a claim, but they most likely have. I just would just urge those lawyers who are advising and those water districts that they insist before the deadline passes for where they can't withdraw their opt-out that they insist on making a determination whether they in fact have PFOS.

MR. SUMMY: I know. I found it disturbing and had some folks look at it on a whim that work with me. And just thought to myself, we have got to get -- we've got to bring this up because we don't want water systems, like you said, who haven't drilled down on this to mistakenly opt-out. When they don't have product ID against 3M, they can stay in and take the money and get all the benefits with none of the downside. So that's one of the reasons I raised it.

The other thing and I talked about this with -in the Dupont settlement, and I call it the big three
because, you know, as a lawyer that does water cases all
over the United States, it's three of the things that I

jump on right out of the gate in looking at cases that we're considering representing clients.

And, you know, the first one is statute of limitations. And again, you've got to look at your state law. But one of the things that is prevalent here is that, remember, the government back in 2013 through 2015 required large systems to test for PFAS, those who served more than 50,000 people. And that testing occurred a long time ago. And there were a number of systems that detected it. And I don't want to see people go down the road who have had this in their system for well over ten years, and then bring a lawsuit and then only to find out that they are kicked out of the case because of the statute of limitations.

THE COURT: And the statute of limitations is not a defense for those that are in the class.

MR. SUMMY: That is correct. And the reason I bring these defenses up is these are the defenses you're avoiding by staying in the class. It doesn't matter if you detected it 40 years ago, you get paid. But if you -- this is just a risk if you're outside. These are real risks.

And even maybe even a greater risk is the statute of repose. There are a number of states that put a time period upon which you can sue a product

manufacturer. And that time period doesn't run from the time you detected it in your water source. It runs from the date the product was delivered for use, and that may have been at an airport or whatever that eventually contaminated you. That product could have been delivered ten years prior to you detecting it, 20 years prior to you detecting it. It is a massive risk if you are in a state with a stringent statute of repose.

THE COURT: Have you made any determination regarding the opt-outs where they might fall on these statute of limitations and statute of repose issues?

MR. SUMMY: Your Honor, I haven't. But it is an analysis that probably is worth doing, you know, if we categorized them into a particular state, we identify the states that have these particular issues. It may well be worth doing. Because these are -- these, to me, and I call them the big three because I try to do this analysis before I bring the case. Because I don't want to get down the road and have this come up. But these are the things that are real risks to opt-outs. And I want to make sure they're aware of it.

The third big one in water cases is are you in a state where the law is not great for you where you are below the regulatory standard? And this one's near and dear to my heart because I live in Texas. And there's a

case there called Taco Cabana vs. Exxon which, unfortunately for plaintiffs, rules that if you're not above a standard, you are not damaged and have no standing.

And I will tell you that one of the very first PFAS cases was brought by my firm in around 2013 time period in Florida. And we lost this on a motion to dismiss. The case was dismissed because we were below the regulatory standard. There wasn't a regulatory standard. But we lost the case on a motion to dismiss right up front. It's a real risk.

THE COURT: Because you have to show you were above an established regulatory standard.

MR. SUMMY: That is correct. And that's what the court ruled, that we didn't have standing for damages because we were not in violation of any sort of standard.

Now, there are cases that go the other way in other states that we've argued. But you've just got to know where you're at and what is the law in where you're at because that's what you're going to be facing.

So, you know, I raise these three, along with the causation issue, for the purposes of just notifying opt-outs that these are not defenses that will prevent you from taking substantial money and getting the benefits in the 3M settlement.

THE COURT: What size were these districts that were required to test by the EPA some years ago?

MR. SUMMY: They were the larger ones. They made you test if you served more than 50,000 people. So they were the larger systems. And what happened is is that the EPA then took that data and said this is bothersome because there's a lot of detections here.

the Safe Drinking Water Act that we're finding today that led to PFAS being listed. At the time, you only had to test for PFOA and PFOS. So EPA was bothered by what they found in 2013 and 2015. So what they did is they said we're going to expand it. We're going to put it back into UCMR5 and not only make people who serve above 50,000 test, we're going to make everyone who serves above 3300 test. And then we're going to select 800 randoms that serve below that. And we're going to expand it to 29 PFAS chemicals instead of the two. So that's how that occurred and that's where that early testing is. It's the larger systems that detected it.

THE COURT: So, you know, obviously, you've now identified counsel who know who opted out districts serving customers of 50,000 or more, they probably need to consult their state statutes of limitation and repose because they may be staring down the barrel of a dismissal

motion even though they may on the facts have a great case.

MR. SUMMY: That is correct, Your Honor. And that's why we're raising it because we just want folks to know what you're signing up for by opting out versus how these don't apply to you if you're in.

The last feature I'm going to cover before I let the others speak, Your Honor, is the release. And I will say this is the most heavily negotiated section of the settlement. And it is one in which in the beginning 3M came in pounding the table and said, look, we are not going to pay billions of dollars to these systems without a complete release. When I mean complete release, that means anything that you could have pled in your lawsuit must be released.

And my co-leads can back me up on this, but myself and Mr. London and Mr. Napoli, we pushed back hard on this. And we said, that's not going to work. We know that there are other systems that are owned by these public entities, such as wastewater, storm water, airports, fire training facilities. We know some of those are going to have to be cleaned up. We know that some of them may be subject to regulation one day. We cannot let those go.

And what we did is we eventually agreed -- and

this was -- you know, this took many months to get through this process over this. And there are times where I truly felt like we're just not going to get there on this. And we eventually agreed through the assistance of the mediator and through the assistance of highly qualified counsel to draw the line at drinking water. We're going to release the drinking water, but we're going to carve out the non-drinking water aspects.

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THE COURT: There are a number of objections claiming you did not do that?

That is correct. And that's what MR. SUMMY: I -- I want to talk about that because a couple of things. One is what the -- once this sort of came out, what the objectors -- most of the objectors, they come forward and they were pointing out, look, there could be all kinds of hypothetical situations where someone drinks the water, they excrete the water, which ends up in the wastewater system, and then the wastewater system discharges that or they discharge the biosolids somewhere else. And everyone was basically saying, look, water is all hydro-geologically connected. So they could just trace that back to drinking water. Because when you look at the release, it says -- the carve outs say that it's carved out if it's separate from and not related in any way to the public water system.

So they were pointing out, look, there's all kinds of sort of hypotheticals that you could -- they could say it's hydro-geologically connected. And when we were negotiating, we were not thinking like that. That's not something we were thinking about because we thought it was more clear. So once they pointed that out, we're like, you know what, let's make it clearer.

THE COURT: Got some guidance.

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That's right. So we went to 3M. MR. SUMMY: We worked with them to come up with a joint interpretive quidance. I'm looking at it here. It was filed with the Court in November of last year. And what we basically said is we clarified what we all meant, which is that when we talk about separate from and not related to, we're talking about that it is separate from and not physically related to. What we were talking about is that the facility must be separate from the drinking water facility. The property, the airport, must be separate from the drinking water facility. And again, these are class counsels' interpretations of how these releases And we thought this interpretive guidance would really assist folks in understanding --

THE COURT: Then there was a complaint you didn't them give enough time, you amended the agreement --

MR. SUMMY: Right.

THE COURT: -- with the guidance.

MR. SUMMY: That's right. But we felt like the guidance would really help folks. And I think that I will say that the guidance has helped a lot of class members.

A lot of class members have said to us that this is really good. I finally understand what was trying to be accomplished.

I will say there's other class members that want to hang on to, well, it could still be somewhat related, you know. So there are folks out there and there could be some folks that may have opted out for that reason, I'm not sure.

But we believe -- it's a difficult thing to do to draw these lines. It's not so easy. We even asked one set of objectors to come up with something different, and they couldn't really come up with anything either.

So we feel like this is a very good way to do it. We feel like it expresses the intent. And we feel like it does operate in a way in which drinking water is clearly it's released. But, thank goodness, everything's not released. The separate facilities, the separate property, the claims that arise from that are not released.

And I will say when you look at the Fourth
Circuit law, when you look at the McAdams vs. Robinson

case, 2022; when you look at Berry vs. Shulman case, 2015; those cases were class action settlements that blessed broad releases. And what those releases actually say is is that the courts blessed those class actions even though the release was anything you could have pled. That is not this case. This case does not release everything that could have been pled. This case releases the drinking water aspect of the claim.

So we believe that the release is reasonable, fair, and adequate given these circumstances. And we believe that the interpretive guidance is very good on this issue and is an assistance to class members.

THE COURT: I thought the concerns raised did cry for an interpretive guidance.

MR. SUMMY: They did.

THE COURT: I knew what y'all were trying to do.

But it could have been said, you know, that it highlighted some of the concerns. And the interpretive guidance, you know, isn't more than just a paragraph or two. It really set in an made y'all think more deeply. And of course, the parties are going to be bound by this interpretive guidance, you know, as part of this settlement agreement.

MR. SUMMY: Right. That is correct, Your Honor.

Your Honor, that concludes my remarks on the

features. I'll let the others speak. And then I will be

back up to speak in the objection areas.

THE COURT: Very good.

Mr. Douglas, are you next?

MR. DOUGLAS: Yes, Your Honor.

Good morning, Your Honor. If it please the Court, counsel, friends, and colleagues, and everyone who has joined us here in the courtroom today?

When I woke up this morning I didn't plan to say what I'm about to say. But in realizing the significance of today and the historical nature of this settlement, I wanted to start off by saying and realizing how long we've been at this particular litigation and how far we've come from the first day, I am now 66 years old, Your Honor. I've been doing this for 36 years. I tried hundreds of cases in those 36 years. I've tried them all sizes, shapes, and variety.

From the very first day, and I think I've mentioned this to you before, the very first day I was sworn into the practice of law, that very afternoon I tried my first case and there's been no turning back since. I was that guy in the office that wanted to try anything and everything. And I didn't care if it was big, small, little, whatever. I would take the worst cases no matter what.

You know, some of the more experienced lawyers

would be happy to let me try some of those less likely to succeed cases. And I tried everything that I could get my hands on. I didn't care and I worked back to back to back for years and years. And I worked my way up the ladder, Your Honor. And I kept winning those so-called impossible cases til about the last 20 years when I was fortunate enough to start to try some significant cases in some of the most important bellwether cases in various areas in the last 20 years beginning with tobacco. It's kind of funny, I've come full circle. I used my very first tobacco trial, Ron Motley's deposition of Jeffrey Wigand, the famous insider, and there's been no turning back.

Since then, I've tried cases against the pharmaceutical industry, the chemical industry, the automobile industry in major bellwether cases, the first bellwether cases. And as you know, the first PFAS cases I was fortunate enough to be co-lead trial counsel. In the first three of those, the C-8 litigation before Judge Sargus in the Southern District Federal Court in Ohio, which is what I suppose led me to your door here and why I'm a part of this litigation, this PFAS litigation.

I wanted to say, with all that in mind, Your
Honor, that it is the greatest honor of my career to be
standing here before you right now in support of our
request for final approval of what would be an historical

settlement and one which would benefit thousands of water providers, I'm proud to say, to be a part of that. It would address a public health issue, if not a crisis, of PFAS contamination in our nation's water supply, and help potentially millions of Americans.

And it's been an honor to be before you in particular, Your Honor. You've always kept us at the height of our game, so to speak, for the last four or five years. And it's been a long -- I've worked night and day for five years to be here.

My kids make fun of me. We worked through a pandemic, as you know. I locked myself in. Those 200 depositions, Mr. Summy, I was --

THE COURT: Y'all wanted to go fly around the country to do them, and I told you you'd kill each other.

MR. DOUGLAS: We probably would have.

THE COURT: Suddenly we discovered we can do depositions remotely.

MR. DOUGLAS: It's one of the benefits, the silver lining of the pandemic. We learned we don't have to fly all across the country to get a lot accomplished. And we accomplished a lot.

And I basically locked myself in our family's dining room with a sign that my children took a picture of. On it was my handwriting, which is not the best, Zoom

In Progress. And it seemed to always been up at all times. And that's what will happen --

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THE COURT: I ran a court from my dining room table. And the happiest moment of our marriage was when I came back to the courthouse.

MR. DOUGLAS: I'm sure my family was happy to get rid of me, too. And I say that because it speaks to the adequacy of which our team was prepared to negotiate what we believe is a fair, reasonable, and adequate settlement. And I'm going to speak to that, to those issues with respect to the requirements of a settlement like this be fair, reasonable, and adequate under Federal Rule 23 and the Jiffy Lube factors, which in particular pertain to the Fourth Circuit, and the four factors regarding fairness, the five factors regarding adequacy. I'm not going to speak to all of the Rule 23 requirements, Jiffy Lube factors. I know the Court is well acquainted with them. But I thought there were some that are worth highlighting here today, particularly with respect to our audience of potential opt-outs who hopefully will come back in, but as they speak to the fair, reasonable, and adequacy of the settlement.

And with that, if I could figure out how to work this, I believe I can, I want to start with addressing adequate representation, Rule 23(e)(2)A. And the

qualifications of counsel, which I'm -- I know you're already familiar with.

THE COURT: Y'all can move on from that one.

That one's pretty obvious. I think counsel on both sides have just, you know, performed at the highest levels of professionalism.

MR. DOUGLAS: Well, that's kind of you to say so. But I just since I didn't want Mr. Summy to have to tout his own extraordinary skills and experience. So I thought I would chime in on that. But it is -- it has been an honor to work with counsel on both sides who are extraordinarily experienced and talented.

But the point is that counsel who negotiated the settlement possessed all of the relevant information, especially with respect to case values necessary to engage in a meaningful negotiation.

THE COURT: One of the criticisms is you didn't have a bellwether, how do you know the value of the case.

MR. DOUGLAS: As we've discussed, Your Honor, we went through a process, a very lengthy process of selecting a bellwether. Let's start with that.

So Mr. Summy mentioned that we had ten bellwethers. But even to get to the ten bellwethers, we looked at hundreds of cases. And we became intimately familiar with the facts and circumstances of the costs of

remediation for so many public water systems across the country to narrow it down to ten. And then to take the ten and narrow it down to the three, and then three to narrow it down to the one.

As you know, Your Honor, you directed that the City of Stuart be the first case to be tried as a representative bellwether. And as I've said before the Dupont hearing and as you probably gleaned over time, we spent night and day, day and night from September, I guess it was 2022 when you selected that case as the first case to go to trial, to prepare it. So we are -- so --

THE COURT: Y'all learned a lot when you just got down to the one case. There were a lot of turns and twists you had not anticipated.

MR. DOUGLAS: Yes. And I think it's helpful to discuss some of those. This is my famous pie chart, Your Honor. I brought it back.

THE COURT: More persuasive than the polar bear chart?

MR. DOUGLAS: The polar bear chart, we're going to leave that one to Mr. McWilliams. But as you know -- and we did learn a lot.

I think this would be helpful since this was a case that the parties agreed was representative of the universe of cases. You know, it began with a chemical

fingerprinting analysis to determine the particular division, but product identification, PFOA that would be attributable to 3M. And as you know, that went through the whole Daubert process. And it involves a very expansive and very complex process to identify isomers, branched isomers, and to understand the ratio of branched to linear so you could identify exactly what portion of the contamination was attributable to each defendant.

And because this was -- and through that process, we learned that about 89 percent, about 89 percent in the City of Stuart was attributable to 3M, between the PFOS and the PFOA that we identified could be attributable by using this fingerprint analysis, this B/L/T method, to identify what PFOA would have been manufactured by 3M.

So first of all, I would say it speaks to the overall equity in terms of what we learned from this particular case and the whole bellwether process. It speaks to the overall equity as between the Dupont and 3M settlement as to why 3M is so much larger in terms of the aggregate amount, about ten times the amount. And it's perfectly illustrated in this case, as Your Honor can see. It's around 89 percent, which is probably a little higher than what we think the market share is, but it's still within the realm of what's representative. So I think

this is a perfect illustration of the equity of the settlement as between Dupont and 3M.

But it also speaks to the adequacy of the 3M settlement itself. And I want to get into that a little bit because we did the analysis. And it's important to understand that counsel in the negotiation process were intimately aware of these facts. And it helped inform them so that they could engage in a meaningful negotiation as to values.

And as you know, with respect to this Stuart case, we calculated claimed damages for remediation of PFOS at about \$77 million. We had two experts who were going to testify as to the type of remediation it would require, the costs of that remediation. We had an economist project out what that would cost in terms of operation and maintenance going forward for decades. And that was about \$77 million.

And so following that through to its natural conclusion at trial, assuming full liability, which is a very big assumption because none of us have a crystal ball and can predict exactly what's going to happen, but assuming full liability by a trial verdict, if 3M was held fully responsible for their portion, which was 89 percent, that would mean 89 percent of 77 million, \$68 million.

And we went and applied the allocation model,

which involves the flow rates and the PFAS levels. We took the actual flow rates and PFAS levels from City of Stuart. And using the allocation model, that would generate about \$17 million from the 3M portion of settlement alone, which is well more than a fraction of the recovery assuming success at trial under the applicable law, which is the Flinn case as we've cited in our brief, a 1977 Fourth Circuit case.

But as Al Jolson said, you ain't seen nothing yet. That's just the beginning because it does not include Dupont, or the defendants, or other potential sources of settlement under -- of funding under the 3M settlement. And by that I mean, and Mr. Summy got into this a little bit, but the Stuart case is a perfect illustration of how well this particular provision, the special needs fund, works.

And if I -- if you may indulge me for a few minutes, I will explain how it would work in this hypothetical with respect to the City of Stuart. I say hypothetical, because as you know, Your Honor, the City of Stuart had their own private settlement. But we'll use it for illustration purposes.

So, first of all, the clause talks about ways in which -- captures expenses that many of our class members incurred that cannot be captured by the allocation model,

that cannot be captured by measuring flow rates, and scoring, and PFAS scores. And Mr. Summy got into some of those. And it's spelled out right here in the Allocation Procedure Section 5-B. And it talks about without limiting the possible actions. And the purpose of that language is because we cannot anticipate all of those circumstances, those unique circumstances, the many thousands of public water systems that may have incurred expenses in response to their PFAS problem that would not be captured under the allocation model. It couldn't be measured by a PFAS and flow rate score. Things like taking wells off line, reducing flow rates, drilling new wells, getting water from other sources, bottled water, while they look to find more permanent solutions to PFAS problems. Those kinds of problems aren't captured.

So to illustrate exactly how important this is, I want to remind the Court we had that -- if you'll recall, the unique circumstance in the City of Stuart where when they first encountered the PFAS problem in 2016 and realized they were over the 70 parts per trillion advisory that had been issued at that time by EPA, their first reactions was, well, we're going to have to abandon our contaminated well, which if you recall was called the Surficial well, Your Honor. And they first looked to find a completely new source of water. And they looked to the

Floridan. I did pronounce that correctly, they do not say Floridian. They look to the Floridan Aquifer if you recall. And they began their plan A, which was to drill four wells into the Floridan, which they knew was not contaminated. And they were going to reply primarily -- they were going to essentially abandon for the most part much of the contaminated Surficial and go to the Floridan at great expense.

When they realized that they had got through Phase One and drilled one well and had already committed to spending \$26 million, they realized that the ion exchange that they had temporarily, at the time believed was temporary, installed in the Surficial was going to be sufficient enough to provide clean water from the Surficial. And more importantly, that going to the Floridan would end up in the long run being far more expensive. So they stayed on the Surficial. So what do you do with that \$26 million that they've already spent and committed to spending? And this is the perfect example of how that would be captured in the 3M settlement.

And so they would be entitled, using this hypothetical, again it's a hypothetical because we know they already settled separately. This is a perfect example of the kinds of expenses that would not be lost,

that would be captured under this settlement and particularly this provision. And I thought the City of Stuart was a perfect example to illustrate just how great this particular clause and provision is.

Real quick, Your Honor, and I think this is -might be mostly what you'd like to hear from me since I
have walked the walk and not just talked the talk on these
cases. I've been in the trenches with defense counsel.
They are highly competent defense counsel. This talks -this speaks to the issue of the strength of the parties'
positions that we must consider when we consider
settlement.

And while, as you know, we believe strongly in our case, and the evidence is strong, no one has a crystal ball and there is no guaranteed success. With that in mind, we also know that 3M had a number of very viable and strong defenses. And those include, believe it or not, product ID, notwithstanding the fact that we know that PFOS is essentially exclusive to 3M. Their defense was that there are other manufacturers. And you still have to go through that process of identifying what's in the water. And you still have to use that B/L/T method to identify that percentage of PFOA that can be attributable specifically to 3M. And as Mr. Summy just mentioned, there are many cases in which there is no PFOA or it's

50/50. In the case of City of Stuart, it was a majority of PFOS and a majority of 3M. That's not always the case.

So whether -- if you do not participate in this settlement, or if we did not engage in this settlement, all of these thousands of water providers would have to go through this very expensive process. And I can tell you, it's in the hundreds -- potentially the hundreds of thousands. It does depend on the size of the system. If you have five wells, it won't require as much sampling. If you have ten wells, 30, some systems have hundreds of wells. So you don't get a pass on product ID in a case against 3M.

The second defense is -- this is whereas Dupont had the defense of PFOA is ubiquitous and it's going to be hard to finger us, so to speak, and to identify our product, there's a critical difference between 3M and all of the other defendants, the so-called telomer defendants; and that is, as we briefly discussed before is that they phased out over two decades ago. And they phased out and they were going to argue that that is evidence of their good stewardship. And their argument was when we learned of the presence of PFOS in the blood of the general population, we did the responsible corporate thing and we announced the phase out. They did that in May of 2000. That's almost 24 years ago.

So in direct comparison to some of the telomer defendants, who I'll leave unnamed for now, who decided to do the opposite. In May of 2000, don't forget 3M announced we're getting out of the perfluorooctanal chemistry business, the C-8s, the PFOA, the PFOS. And what happened was that void was filled by a lot of those telomer makers, even though they were all warned, we were all warned that these perfluorooctanal chemistries may not be good for the environment. They may not be good for the general public. Yet other companies jumped in. So they were going to argue that they were the good corporate stewards. And they could make a very strong case about that.

Now, we know there was some dispute as to whether or not they really knew about the presence of PFOA or PFOS in the blood of the general population years before. We believe the evidence was strong and we were prepared to prove that at trial. Nonetheless, it is always a question of fact. And I don't think I have to digress into the whole die and tape story (phonetic). I know you're well familiar with that story.

But if a jury chose to believe that 3M didn't understand fully the extent of which the contamination was in the general population, then one could argue that they exercised good corporate stewardship in contrast to some

of these other defendants.

And I hate to mention the P word, punitive damages. But for those who think it would be a cake walk to get punitive damages, they should be cautioned to remember that 3M got out of the business 24 years ago.

THE COURT: Yeah, sometimes lawyers have this absolute romantic -- litigators, romantic belief in punitive damages. The number of cases that actually have an award of punitive damages that stick, I think it's less than one percent. And if -- I've always told lawyers, both when I was litigating and since I've been on the bench, if you're valuing your case on the basis of punitive damages, you're playing with fool's gold. There's just no way to know because these things are complicated. And the jury charge for punitives is not an easy charge. It is not easy for plaintiffs to overcome.

MR. DOUGLAS: And nor is the case law in terms of what is sustainable. I often say when I hear about these multi-billion dollar verdicts, it's not worth the verdict sheet it was written on. It's going to get overturned or reduced significantly.

But in this case, my point is, sir, that there was a very good argument that we would have to address.

And should any lawyer be bold enough to try this, and I would warn folks not to try this at home, it's not an easy

case. They have a very good argument that they exercised good corporate stewardship. One we were prepared, make no mistake about it, to confront and expose, but that was going to be their argument.

And third -- one other point I should make here. It's likely, if you drill down to the science, that 3M's allocation overall contamination is probably going to decrease over time for the simple fact that they got out --

THE COURT: The telomer was later.

MR. DOUGLAS: Telomer was later. And just by the nature of the science, it leaches down into the aquifers later. It's not that -- it's a forever, it's not going anywhere. We do need to treat the 3M product. But the relative proportion is going to probably change over time.

And in that regard, I would caution folks don't strike while the iron is cold. The iron is hot right now. And this is the time to do it. And folks are going to find themselves, if they're unfortunate enough to opt-out, to get a trial six, seven, eight years from now, they're going to be looking at a very different landscape. And all of the problems that come, associated with proving a telomer case will be even greater to overcome.

And the third thing, as I mentioned in the

Dupont hearing, is the government contractor defense.

Folks think that we won the government contractor. But the Court --

THE COURT: Factual dispute.

MR. DOUGLAS: It's a factual -- it's still a question of fact. And that's going to be especially problematic with a source of contamination are military sites. And I know that many of the opt-out cases, and many of the cases that are in are -- were contaminated, public water systems were contaminated from military sites. Therefore, the government contractor defense, which could have provided complete immunity for all the defendants, not just 3M by the way, that problem is going to be -- is going to exist.

And it's going to be even more problematic for those who have not only sued the private entities like 3M, Dupont, and the other manufacturers or part makers, but where you've sued the United States Government and you've caused, in essence, I will call double trouble. Because you have two hurdles to overcome. The government immunity defense the government is going to assess, and the Court has yet to rule on, and the government contractor defense. And so settlement absolves all of those problems. They all go away if you're part of this settlement.

And those are some of the factors that counsel

considered in negotiating -- into entering into this negotiation and in advocating this settlement, and some of the things that folks who have opted out should be thinking about, especially in these circumstances where --

THE COURT: Mr. Douglas, I am aware that of all the people who were disappointed when the case was settled, you were at the top of the list because you were prepared to try the greatest case of your life.

MR. DOUGLAS: As I said, Your Honor, it's the greatest case I never got to try.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DOUGLAS: And --

THE COURT: They kept you out of the discussions because they knew that you were a warrior. And I just think folks who are thinking about, oh, I can do better, you know, need to recognize you're like the only guy on the planet who has actually tried one of these cases as a plaintiff's lawyer.

MR. DOUGLAS: I could speak to that, Your Honor. And I think it would be helpful if I did so. But let me start by saying that so, yeah, I was -- they kept me away from negotiations. They wanted to keep me rabid and ready to fight. And I was. But my better angels told me that by far this was the path to take.

And so what we did, Your Honor, as I mentioned

at the Dupont hearing, is we had a negotiation team and a litigation team. And the negotiation team was led by Mr. Summy and his co-leads, Mr. Napoli and Mr. London. And we kind of -- and we had a litigation team that I headed up with a very, very talented team.

And while we were separate teams, we collectively referred to ourselves, as we mentioned in the brief, as the strike force. And we didn't practice in silos. We shared information, except for those things that were confidential to counsel negotiating couldn't share with us, in order to put our negotiating team in the strongest possible position, a position of strength and knowledge to negotiate.

So, yes, on the evening of June 4th, I was ready to go. And our team knew that we were ready to go. And when they negotiated this settlement, they were in the best possible and strongest possible position to settle this case.

So even though, to get back to your question about, well, there's been some criticism about there's been no bellwether, I could assure you, we could put that trial on right now. And we know everything about that trial. And it helped inform settlement counsel in terms of the result that was obtained.

THE COURT: Well, it's sometimes said that the

best settlement is on the day before trial, the result is the best the day before trial, not putting at risk adverse outcomes. And let me say, some of the same factors you pointed to as potential challenges, there were challenges for 3M on the other side. They had concerns, legitimate concerns. And nobody could predict how a jury, who we had not even selected, might respond to this conflicting evidence. And that's what prudent lawyers do is they work things out to eliminate the exposure all of them have for the disastrous outcome.

MR. DOUGLAS: You're exactly right.

THE COURT: You're buying insurance. A settlement is like purchasing an insurance policy.

MR. DOUGLAS: Absolutely. And just to address some of those issues of the uncertainty of trial -- and I'll wrap up in a few minutes. I know we've been going a while, Your Honor. But let me address some of those with respect to the Jiffy Lube factors and Factor 3, costs, risks, delay of trial and appeal. As you know, it took us five years to get to that -- four years to get -- it's five years now, but it took us four years. And it's not like we were all twiddling our thumbs. With had plenty to do. We took hundreds of depositions. We had motions. And it takes time to get a case to trial, especially one of this complexity.

THE COURT: Let me just say, if you folks want me to remand these cases to my 675 colleagues around the country, this will be on any of them the most complicated case on their docket. Okay?

MS. HARROD: There is an incredible learning curve that will be involved.

THE COURT: I'm very reluctant to impose on my colleagues what took us four years of intense study to get to. And then for the parties to litigate them all over the United States at great expense, I think you estimated in Dupont that it would take somewhere around \$2 million to prepare an individual case.

MR. DOUGLAS: Correct, Your Honor. And we've spent that money in the Stuart case. So we speak from authority. We have walked that walk. And I did that in the C-8 cases. And just to remind the Court, I tried the first C-8 case I think it was 2016? It all sort of blends together.

Was it 2016?

2015.

THE COURT: You lost a year.

MR. DOUGLAS: I lost a year. It all blends together. I had a wait another year to try the second case. Won that one as well. Almost another year to try the third case and won that as well. And it was not until

the fourth case, which by then I said I'm done, let somebody else try it, it settled in the middle of that fourth case. And as a cautionary tale, as I mentioned at the Dupont hearing, there was a case just to illustrate the length of time it would take --

THE COURT: A decade. It took a decade.

MR. DOUGLAS: It took a decade for the one case that was not part of the settlement. Took a verdict in 2020. So it took me years after the settlement, the class settlement with the 3,000 members in the area of the Dupont plant in that case, to get to verdict. And it was only until about a couple of months ago, went through the entire appellate process, reached the Supreme Court until they finally got final resolution and the Supreme Court denied cert.

So that's what folks who are -- so meanwhile, I just think about -- and I feel for some of these opt-outs you know, who while we're in the middle of this settlement and they'll be on the outside looking in, seeing thousands and thousands of their fellow public water systems getting millions and millions of dollars to address the PFAS. And they're going to say to their lawyers, what happened? Where's my case? Where's my trial? This is seven years down the road, six years, eight years down the road and we have a PFAS problem that has not been remediated, or we

had to raise rates, and cause all kind of problems. It will be some lawyers are going to have to answer some tough questions from their clients. And I think I said something about maybe those lawyers need to make sure their malpractice premiums are paid up. That's how I personally feel about it.

And because it would take years, it would take decades to get to every case. Years, as you pointed out yourself, Your Honor, in your order of December 5th, that it could take up to a decade between the time which it's remanded, it goes to each individual original court of jurisdiction, go through their calendar. Appellate process could take a decade. And it did take a decade in case of that one party that did not participate in the C-8 class settlement.

And then there are the significant costs of experts. It's millions. The appellate process. The length of each trial. And last on this issue on costs, risks, and delay is that there is a very limited universe of lawyers who know these cases well. And I look at some of these advertisements out there, other lawyers holding themselves out to be experts in the field of PFAS. And honestly, and to be blunt, I've never heard of them and I've been doing this for over a decade myself. And it just, it irks me and I feel bad for some of these class

members that should be in this class who are led to believe that they might have -- and that's not to say that I am the best trial lawyer in the world.

THE COURT: You're up there, Mr. Douglas.

MR. DOUGLAS: Well, I appreciate you saying so, Your Honor. But, you know, it's not to say that there aren't other competent lawyers that could do this. But I know two of them. Where is Mr. Bowden? I believe he's in the courtroom. He's the only one I -- he and I are the only two in this courtroom, and his partner Mike Papantonio, it's a very small universe who have actually walked this walk and know what -- I come from a place where I know what it's like to be in the trenches.

And defense counsel have the very, very best, the very, very best representation and they've had the very best. We've butted heads at times, as you know, Your Honor, with defense counsel over these years. But they're extraordinarily talented and they're very good.

And Beth Wilkinson and Bryan Stekloff, who were going to be their lead counsel, I've tried cases against them. They are some of the very best lawyers. So it's easy to sit here on the outside and say, well, I'll just get my trial. I'll opt-out and get a trial. And my lawyer says he's the leader in the field of PFAS. They published some kind of PFAS pamphlet or something. But

when it comes time to getting into the courtroom, there's not a lot of lawyers who know this stuff and have the institutional knowledge to do it. And I will tell you, I'm 66 years old. I'm about done. So I might not be available, putting all modesty aside.

And so those are some of the things that I'm speaking to some of the opt-outs. And we're fortunate that the Court has issued an order to extend the time for them to come back in. And these are some of the things that I think these opt-outs need to think about. It's that old saying, please do not try that at home. These are professionals. It's not an easy case in so many ways.

THE COURT: For the people who have not been in, preparing these cases for trial, and who are going to be coming in basically green, they're going to meet a 3M team that has -- is hardened by years of battle. They're ready to go.

MR. DOUGLAS: And they have been planning -- I don't want to say planning in any nefarious way. I don't mean it that way. But they have had years, they've had decades to think this through. So if you're just to the party now because you heard about a \$12.5 billion settlement, and you say, well, let's see what's going on with them. And let's put out a PFAS pamphlet and get some clients. It ain't that easy. These folks on the defense

have been planning their defense for decades and years. I mean, not necessarily in the litigation sense, but they know this subject matter better than you, than some of those lawyers do by any stretch of the imagination. It's no cake walk.

THE COURT: It's like walking into a bar and picking a fight with the biggest guy in the room.

MR. DOUGLAS: Probably worse than that.

THE COURT: He and his friends, right?

MR. DOUGLAS: He and his friends and then regretting it shortly thereafter.

And again, I think some of these water systems that remain out, that have opted out, remain out, will be looking from the outside in as their fellow other water systems by the thousands are receiving millions and millions of dollars and they're outside in the cold. And they should be thinking about that.

I want to just move it along, Your Honor, to Factor 5 of Jiffy Lube that talks about the degree of opposition. This is going to be my last factor I'll be talking about. And as you know, there are six remaining objectors which equates to about .05 percent. A degree of opposition is one of the factors, it's Factor 5 under Jiffy Lube. And if you think about .05 percent of class

members have made objections --

THE COURT: Yeah, but there's also a larger number, obviously, of opt-outs.

MR. DOUGLAS: Well, I am going to get to that next, Your Honor.

which we can measure the degree of opposition and weighs so heavily in favor of settlement because the percent is so small with respect to objections but also small with respect to opt-outs. And water systems can opt-out for any number of reasons that are unique to them. But we do know that the majority of those opt-outs -- and the overwhelming majority of class members did not opt-out. That's just a fact. And the majority of those that did are what we call the Phase Two. In other words, they have no detection. They have no case. And many of them don't want to get involved. They say why should I get involved in this settlement?

THE COURT: What's the split between Phase One and Phase Two of the opt-outs? How does that split in terms of what percentage of them are in Phase One and which are -- what percentage are in Phase Two?

MR. DOUGLAS: I was told to be very careful about that, but it's two-thirds.

MR. SUMMY: Your Honor, it's about 68 percent of

Phase Twos, about 32 percent of Phase One.

MR. DOUGLAS: And so I think all of that, taken as a whole, between the paucity of objections relative to the size of the class, and the fact that the overwhelming majority have not opted out. And even for those that opted out, the majority, 68 percent to answer your question, have no case anyway, speaks very strongly and loudly in terms of the degree of opposition, which is virtually non-existent and, therefore, weighs heavily overall in the approval.

THE COURT: Mr. Douglas, I do think of this
32 percent who have positive PFAS findings and who have
opted out, I do think y'all need to inform them about
those who have no likely 3M liability. I mean --

MR. DOUGLAS: I agree.

THE COURT: I think that is a really important matter. And unless you're really digging, you wouldn't know that. I mean, you've got to really get into the weeds to figure out. So if you -- now, you've got positive PFAS, you've got a potential contribution from 3M. And if you opt-out, you get nothing. That is -- I think that borders on being reckless by the lawyers who do that. If they don't know that, that is a problem.

MR. DOUGLAS: And that's something that troubles me deeply, Your Honor. And I do think that we need to get

the message out. One of the reasons why I'm addressing some of these subjects today since we're in a public forum

THE COURT: I think part of our audience here, I said this to my law clerk as I was walking in, I said, you know, the audience here are those who have opted out. This discussion is a great opportunity to learn, not just from the advocates of the plan, but those who have objections and to hear your exchange. I think that's a very valuable piece of information. But I mean, I was not aware that you had a significant, 25 percent apparently, it's a rough number that Mr. Summy reported.

MR. DOUGLAS: Right.

THE COURT: So if that happens to involve the 32 percent who were in Phase One, you've got a quarter of them are walking away from free money.

MR. DOUGLAS: Free money. And it borders on irresponsible if, you know, if they do walk away without knowing that it -- you have to make informed decisions. And that's our obligation as lawyers. And lawyers should know the answer to those questions before they make a recommendation.

THE COURT: Right. If they're in Phase Two, you wouldn't know whether they got -- they will eventually if they, A, will they get a positive PFAS finding? And

secondly, will it be 3M? That's something you wouldn't have a way of knowing. You could be informed that 25 percent don't. But, you know, the ones with the positive finding, you need to go determine, you know, what's our story? Because it is -- I don't think you can make an informed decision without knowing that.

MR. DOUGLAS: I completely agree, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Your due diligence should be before you walk your clients out, you ought to know, hey, I actually have a claim. And I think they also need to determine do they get tested in that earlier period? Is there a statute of limitations, statute of repose issue? And you're saying these are things you need to know because I think they have the potential of, you know, of just walking away from claims that are perhaps not very valuable for a sure -- literally a sure thing.

MR. DOUGLAS: And I agree. And to my point about, you know, some lawyers may have some tough questions to answer later on. If they don't --

THE COURT: Mr. Summy wants to tell us something.

MR. SUMMY: One this I just want to tell Your Honor, I want to correct something I said before. I said that the earlier testing was for folks who served 50,000 or more, it was actually 10,000 or more.

1	THE COURT: So they
2	MR. SUMMY: So there's a lot more folks that
3	tested early. They just need to understand.
4	THE COURT: I mean, there may be reasons that
5	people in good faith, well informed, can say I want to
6	opt-out. They have their own strategic, very specific
7	arguments and concerns that might make that a legitimate
8	judgment call. But you've got to be informed.
9	MR. SUMMY: Right.
10	THE COURT: And you need to consider all the
11	risks and all the benefits. And then you make the old
12	bird is a bird in hand worth two in the bush? And the
13	old another old adage, the enemy of the good is
14	perfect.
15	MR. SUMMY: Right.
16	MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah.
17	THE COURT: Mr. Douglas, anything further?
18	MR. DOUGLAS: I think that's it unless Your
19	Honor has any questions.
20	THE COURT: I'm good.
21	Okay. Who is next from the plaintiffs side?
22	MS. FEGAN: I am, and I can be quick again.
23	THE COURT: Good, Ms. Fegan. We've got far too
24	many suits here. We need a little more gender diversity.
25	I've been wanting to do that in this MDL world. And we're

going to keep pushing that.

MS. FEGAN: Well, I'm happy to be here for that reason, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good.

MS. FEGAN: Elizabeth Fegan for plaintiffs.

Your Honor, Mr. Summy and Mr. Douglas have given us

99 percent of the reasons why this final approval should
be granted. But we can't get there without passing Rule

23. And so I'm going to focus real briefly on Rule 23(a)

and Rule 23(b)(3).

Your Honor, numerosity, I think we've had a lot of discussion. That's obviously satisfied.

Typicality is really important here. We have had class representatives, public water systems that have stood up on both Phase One and Phase Two in order to look at this settlement, ensure that their claims are representative of the class, and look at the settlement and determine that this makes sense in their respective phases.

Your Honor, we also lead counsel made sure that there were adequate -- adequacy both with respect to counsel and with respect to those clients. Structural protections were put in place to ensure that Phase One and Phase Two were represented both with respect to substantive fairness. As you heard Mr. Summy talk about

with the equalizer and ensuring equity on both sides, as well as an ensuring on the procedural fairness of the settlement.

And I think really critical here is that Rule 23 was designed to cover commercial claims like this. These are claims that with information and obviously with informed consent, these public water systems can come in and understand and quantify their damages and quantify what this settlement means to them. And that makes predominant -- common issues predominate over any unique issues.

Finally, Your Honor, with respect to notice and due process, Ann Jung here (phonetic), as the notice provider, really put together in conjunction with class counsel a notice plan that far exceeds the gold standard or even the minimum standard for reach, but certainly is the gold standard for reach, reaching over 95 percent of the class with direct notice, supplemented by other types of notice such as publication notice. And, certainly, we've seen from the drum beat of hooves here a number of people that had comments and, ultimately, decided that with the different interpretive guidances that the settlement made sense for them, that we have satisfied due process.

THE COURT: I think a lot of these comments you

1 received have really helped with these interpretive 2 guidances and they get a better agreement. 3 I agree, Your Honor. And providing MS. FEGAN: 4 those interpretive guidances on the websites and ensuring 5 that class counsel went out to different broad nationwide associations, local water associations, to make sure that 6 7 public water systems had the information that they needed 8 to make informed decisions was really critical. 9 So for those reasons, Your Honor, we ask that 10 the class be certified and that the settlement be granted 11 final approval. 12 THE COURT: Very good. 13 MS. FEGAN: Thank you. 14 THE COURT: Anyone else from the plaintiff? 15 MR. SUMMY: I think that's it for now, Your 16 Honor. 17 THE COURT: How about the professor or is he at 18 the end? At the end? 19 Yes, that's at the end, Your Honor. MR. SUMMY: 20 THE COURT: That's fine. 21 Okay. Mr. Bulger? 22 MR. BULGER: Thank you, Your Honor. 23 surprisingly, we may not agree with every single statement 24 that the plaintiffs made today. We may not agree with 25 everything. But we do agree with the proposition that

this is a fair, reasonable, and adequate settlement. And we have nothing further to add at this time.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Bulger, I'm a little anxious if there's something about that goes to the likely impact of this settlement, if there's a disagreement, I think this is the time to voice it. Because I think the parties here, including those who have opted out or may be considering to come in, they need to know that if there's a dispute here, what they're walking into. Because part of the settlement idea is that, you know, this is over. And if we're just starting another round of litigation, that may be a reason to opt-out.

MR. BULGER: Understood, Your Honor. And again, we have nothing further to add.

THE COURT: So there's nothing you can identify that specifically you disagree with with the plaintiffs in terms of their interpretation of the settlement agreement?

MR. BULGER: No, not as couched by Mr. Summy.

THE COURT: Very good. Thank you.

Mr. Douglas, they didn't agree with you.

MR. DOUGLAS: Your Honor, I was going to say something about how they're leadership today has demonstrated great stewardship. I don't think they would take in engaging in the settlement, I don't think you have any disagreement with that.

MR. BULGER: No, of course not.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me hear from the objectors from the City of Vancouver and Dupont, Washington.

Mr. Kray, good to see you again.

MR. KRAY: And you as well. Thank you for the opportunity to speak today. I'm here, Jeff Kray, on behalf of Marten Law. With me today is my partner, Jessica Ferrell. You may only hear from me today. It depends on what questions, if any, the Court has on the claims-over provision, which we'll talk about.

We're here on behalf of two entities that filed objections to the 3M settlement as proposed. And they are the City of Dupont and the City of Vancouver, Washington. We also represent 15 other entities that filed objections to the agreement. But we do not rise to speak for them today because due to concerns about that settlement, those entities exercised their opt-out rights. I think the Court is aware of the other 15. I won't go through the names unless it's useful to you.

THE COURT: No, I know them.

MR. KRAY: I do want to raise at the outset an objection to Mr. Douglas' reference to malpractice insurance. I think that's an inappropriate aspersion on public officers.

THE COURT: I tried to make the same point, which is that there may be good faith reasons to opt-out. They may be specific to your client that may be reasonable basis.

I think the point is, and I don't think this is necessarily focused on you or your firm, is that you need to exercise due diligence if you're going to opt-out. And there are critical pieces of information that you need to dig down into about like do I actually have a claim against this defendant? And is my claim expired? And issues that are fairly fundamental. Your firm's experienced. I'm confident you've looked at those issues. But there are some late show ups here that I have my doubts.

MR. KRAY: I appreciate that, Your Honor. And I appreciate your comments. I'm actually more concerned about my city attorneys that I represent and others and feeling that they are not -- they're being alleged not to have done their jobs. And my clients --

THE COURT: I don't know -- I wouldn't know -- I was a former city attorney. I normally would hand out to litigation counsel the jobs. So I don't think anybody's talking about them.

MR. KRAY: Well, I appreciate that. I will say that those city attorneys are directly involved in these

cases. And they do a fantastic job. And they're wonderful public servants. And I want to say that on the record.

The Cities of Vancouver --

THE COURT: Your clients are now happy.

MR. KRAY: I am. The Cities of Vancouver and Dupont have objected to aspects of the settlement agreement but have withdrawn their objections as to class certification and do not oppose approval of this settlement. I want to be clear on this point as well, Your Honor. I am speaking today on behalf of those two cities. They preserve their other written objections. And all of our other objector clients also preserve those objections, their written objections.

Rather, these cities object principally to the settlement terms that threaten to impair their rights to seek recovery for PFAS harms either to interests unrelated to public water systems or from other liable parties. And that will be a theme.

The cities are acutely aware that the settlement is but a piece of the puzzle necessary to bring needed funds to remove PFAS from our nation's water systems.

They appreciate the opportunity to have access to those funds.

Their concerns about this settlement lie chiefly

with how it intersects with the challenging issues yet to come fully before this Court. We will be all back here again on those issues. And it is in our mutual interest to clearly define how this piece fits with the other pieces that coming over the horizon.

Vancouver and Dupont have proposed amendments that would address aspects of the settlement to improve it and a clear path for some public water systems to withdraw their request for exclusion.

Our complete objections have been fully briefed.

We'll focus today on our primary proposed amendments and
the reason why we think they're fair and appropriate.

First, the scope of the 3M release remains overbroad. 3M class counsel and class counsel state that the settlement is limited to drinking water. However, Section 11.1 extends the release beyond PFAS arising from drinking water in certain respects to include PFAS from other sources --

The best example that we can provide is biosolids, the non-liquid portion of our wastewater that is removed from the wastewater and then disposed to landfills, incinerated, or often recycled and reused in some fashion, including as fertilizer and agricultural and other settings. And I think we may hear further about this today from Broward County on this same point.

Biosolids are not derived from drinking water, but from the waste stream that results from water use by parties other than the public water system or a wastewater utility. Yet Section 11.1 sub 3 in the 3M settlement has settling public water systems releasing those claims for settlement allocation process that doesn't account for the value. It's just not built into the formula. Great formula, but it doesn't pick up this point that is part of the release. Because the formula only measures the value of the claim as associated with the drinking water portion, not all of the other things that enter the waste stream post the distribution of the drinking water.

THE COURT: Are you saying you can't bring a claim regarding PFAS in your drinking -- in your wastewater or in your waste system? You can't --

MR. KRAY: I am saying that even where physically separate, there are portions of the settlement agreement that still cause a release of those type of biosolids claims. There will still be an argument made that you have released those claims.

THE COURT: The plaintiffs have said that's not correct. I asked 3M do they dispute it? They didn't. So I'm wondering sort of why are we still arguing about it? They issued a guidance on it. They -- the -- they claim that's not correct. They've tried to address it and some

of it in response to your suggestions.

So, I mean, I'm wondering whether, you know -there's going to be no perfect settlement, right? You
know that. You've been around this game long enough. And
the question is, haven't they gone considerably towards
solving this problem? Sure, could there be some, you
know, odd set of circumstance that -- but, I mean, I'm
hearing you, are you sort of telling me that a biosolid,
they're going to argue, well, the biosolids came from
something with the drinking water, so thus it's included?
Is that basically what you're saying?

MR. KRAY: It is, Your Honor.

THE COURT: They say not. They say it's not.

MR. KRAY: I appreciate that. They may say that today, but their briefing doesn't say that. So the joint guidance was on November 29th. I agree, the joint guidance, very helpful, covered a lot of ground. But in class counsel's response to objections on January 9th, on Pages 21 and 22, they concede that the release continues to include damages to biosolids, wastewater, storm water on third-party property.

So, yes, it addresses the settling drinking water system, but these systems then cause these materials to be spread out through the community in ways that class counsel concedes are not released. And that's where the

over-breadth is. And that's where we have an opportunity over the course of the next month to continue talking, make some changes, address these further concerns, and give these other parties that are concerned about not opting back in a chance to do so if these are addressed.

And we concur with Broward County's points on this particular issue as well, Your Honor.

Second, we propose exempting the federal government from application of the claims-over clause. This would accord with the existing state exemption that is in the agreement, provided needed assurance to public water systems concerned about compromising their claims against the Department of Defense. Next thing coming up in line, Your Honor. And thereby remove a barrier to settling with 3M.

And third, we propose affirmatively clarifying that releasing parties only release as to related entities for whom they have legal authority to release. There's fuzzy language in that regard about relationships between parties that could be easily clarified by simply saying only those for whom you have legal authority to release.

We believe these requests are reasonable and consistent with the settlement's purpose and scope. They would not substantially diminish the protections afforded to 3M for drinking water settlement, but would improve the

agreement's fairness and therefore potentially increase participation.

We have shared with class counsel our proposed changes to the settlement agreement in red line format. On January 11th -- our January 11th letter that we sent to class counsel is referenced on Page 5 as Exhibit A of our January 16, 2024, reply in support of our objections. I do apologize, Your Honor. I realized last night that we actually failed to attach the exhibit. We corrected that this morning so the Court now does have the red line and can see the proposed changes that we've made.

We welcome any questions you may have.

THE COURT: I appreciate your contribution, your continuing to discuss these matters with the parties in the case.

MR. KRAY: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

Let me hear from Broward County.

MS. HARROD: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning. Good to have you

here.

MS. HARROD: Thank you. Thank you for having me. It's a pleasure to visit your city. We appreciate the opportunity to speak. Rene Harrod from Broward County, Your Honor.

Broward County supports this settlement, Your Honor. We appreciate the very hard work that this represents from all the counsel represented here before you today, Your Honor. However, we do suggest a few small tweaks to the settlement, Your Honor, detailed in our objections to better reflect the parties' expressed intent here today and to better protect the class members.

Your Honor, Broward County asserted five objections which are detailed in our filing. I'm going to take them out of order, starting with the easy ones (and work my way up to the hard ones.

Starting first, Your Honor, with our third objection. This regarded the disconnect between the amended Exhibit P in Section 11.1.5 of the settlement agreement. Counsel amended Exhibit P but didn't update those changes to 11.1.5. They caught it --

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry. I didn't -
MS. HARROD: Update those changes to Section

11.1.5. I noted that objection in our filing. They

corrected it, Your Honor.

I point this out only to indicate and to remind Your Honor why they said in their filing they corrected it. They said to better reflect the intent of the settlement and to avoid any potential confusion about the governing language. Those same two rationales dictate a

few other changes as well, Your Honor.

For example, our fifth objection. Your Honor, this regards Section 11.4 where our releasing party, such as Broward County, is required to represent and warrant that any future additions, modifications, or improvements to its water system due to PFAS will be the sole responsibility of the releasing party and not the released parties. Your Honor, this is obviously incorrect. There are other defendants in this very action that arguably have liability for some of those costs.

Class counsel in their response confirmed the language is intended to be just vis-a-vis the releasing party and the released parties. But that's not what the language says, Your Honor. And this isn't just a contract obligation, this is a representation and warranty that Broward County has to make.

Your Honor, construed literally, as we have to with a written contract of that nature, every plaintiff would violate that representation and warranty on day one. Because we have contended and do continue to contend that other defendants are liable.

Just a few extra words, Your Honor, in the settlement agreement would resolve this concern to better reflect the intent of the parties as expressed here today and to avoid any potential confusion. We included those

extra one, two, three, four, five words in our objection, Your Honor.

Moving on, Your Honor, to our fourth objection. This regards the interplay between the definition of the term released -- pardon me, releasing parties and the protection against rate pairs (phonetic) in Section 11.4. The release guidance, which we very much appreciate, clarifies this does not -- the release does not affect PI claims. We appreciate that clarification. That goes a long way.

However, the remaining concern with 11.4 is that it requires that no releasing party ever assert that any future rate increase was attributable to 3M. Your Honor, under Florida law, where I come from, a single department director or a single elected county commissioner cannot bind Broward County without action by our Board of County Commissioners. But this provision in the settlement agreement, Section 11.4, permits a single department director or a single elected county commissioner to put the entire county in breach of the settlement agreement merely by saying that some future rate increase is attributable in some small part to 3M in some shape or form.

Once again, Your Honor, it's a simple fix. We proposed it in our objection. Just adding the words that

no releasing party shall be authorized by a class member to assert on behalf of that class member that any future rate increase is attributable to 3M.

Your Honor, turning to some of the harder ones, the last couple. Our second objection does deal with the reuse and the biosolids. The settlement agreement as written arguably requires release of those claims. Class counsel confirmed in their response that the claims are actually intentionally released, such that if Broward County was sued by a third-party for damages caused by distribution of reuse or biosolids on their property, we would arguably be unable to bring a cause of action against 3M for that.

Your Honor, that's a large unknown liability for a lot of potential class members. Thankfully, in Broward County, we have contractual provisions that protect us from that liability. But we do wish that it were authorized, Your Honor. We would much prefer it not be part of the release. But I realize that I can't win every battle. And as Your Honor said, perfect is sometimes the enemy of the good.

The last objection, Your Honor, that I would ask you to take under consideration though and do ask the parties to change in the situation is our first objection.

And this is the issue about some of the migrating drinking

water. The issue is whether drinking water through a burst pipe or similar situation may have caused some tiny portion, however small, of additional PFAS-related damage to real property, storm water, or wastewater systems that are already tainted separately with PFAS.

To assert any of these three claims, real property, storm water, or wastewater under 11.1.3 or 11.1.4.1, Broward County has to affirm that those claims do not, quote, arise out of, relate to, or involve PFAS that entered the drinking water system. That would mean that no class member could assert a real property claim, for example, if any of those damages, however minuscule, came from PFAS tainted drinking water.

Now, class counsel points to the release guidance and says that moots my concern. Your Honor, we appreciate the addition of the word physically where it was clarified in the release guidance, but that's not the issue. The issue is whether some small part of the claim, not whether the facilities are physically separated, but whether any small part of the claim, the damage to the real property, arises out of tainted drinking water.

They put the bandaid on the wrong spots, Your Honor. They put the bandaids on a little too high of Sections 11.1.2.1 and 11.1.2.2. And it needs to be a little three I of those sections, Your Honor.

We also need a second bandaid under similar sections, 11.1.3 and 11.1.4.1, both of which also require class members to affirm in the filing of our real property claim, which is not intended to be released here, that those claims don't arise out of, relate to, or involve be PFAS tainted drinking water.

Again, we've proposed simple fixes in our filing, Your Honor. And we would ask that those be adopted for the same reasons that the other objections were resolved by class counsel, to better reflect the intent of the parties in this settlement and to avoid any potential confusion about the governing language.

Again, Your Honor, we support this. We're a class member. We're a Phase One class member. And thank you for your time and counsel's time as well.

THE COURT: Thank you for your presentation.

Folks, I would like to take a break. I am going to kill my staff here if we keep going. And let's break til about 1:15. Okay? Because I want to hear, I know, Mr. Kray, you want to say something else?

MR. KRAY: I would like to make a clarification before you break.

THE COURT: Come on up for that. Because I want to hear -- I want to fully have the plaintiffs -- the parties have a chance to respond to these objections.

1	MR. KRAY: Thank you.
2	·
	THE COURT: Certainly.
3	MR. KRAY: I want to make sure, there was a
4	carefully crafted stipulation that was filed yesterday.
5	It's Docket No. 4436. And the fourth bullet point on
6	there we stand by. I didn't want anything I said today to
7	seek to undermine our stipulation with regard to what that
8	provision says.
9	THE COURT: I presumed you would live by your
10	stipulation, Mr. Kray.
11	MR. KRAY: Thank you.
	·
12	THE COURT: Thank you.
13	Okay. Let's take a break. We'll be back here
14	at 1:15.
15	(WHEREUPON, a break was taken.)
16	(WHEREUPON, court was called to order at 1:20 PM.)
17	THE COURT: Please be seated.
18	We're missing Mr. Summy?
19	MR. DOUGLAS: He should be right out there.
20	MR. LONDON: If Mr. Napoli doesn't come back,
21	then we might have a problem. (Pause.)
22	THE COURT: Okay. We're going to resume. And I
23	would like to hear from class counsel concerning the
24	objections.
25	MR. SUMMY: Thank you, Your Honor. Scott Summy

1 again for the record. 2 Your Honor, it was great to hear that the 3 objectors that appeared here today are in support of the 4 settlement but they have a few issues they wanted to 5 address. The primary issue I want to focus on raised by 6 7 Mr. Kray and by Broward County deal with, you know, 8 several hypothetical scenarios and this is the kind of 9 thing that --10 THE COURT: Are we talking about here when 11 drinking water goes into wastewater and that circumstance? 12 MR. SUMMY: Yes. 13 THE COURT: Because as I understand it, as long 14 as they're physically separated, it's not covered, 15 correct, by the release? 16 MR. SUMMY: That is correct. 17 THE COURT: Okay. And I got the example of 18 Ms. Harrod about a pipe. 19 MR. SUMMY: Right. 20 THE COURT: Okay. A pipe leaks of drinking 21 water into wastewater. I must say, how anybody'd prove 22 it, where it came from, would be just --23 MR. SUMMY: Right. Right. 24 THE COURT: This is like dancing angels on top 25 of a pinhead.

1	MR. SUMMY: Correct.
2	THE COURT: Think about all the ways in which
3	PFAS might get into the wastewater.
4	MR. SUMMY: Correct.
5	THE COURT: I think the last place one would
6	normally think about would be a leaking pipe from drinking
7	water.
8	MR. SUMMY: Right.
9	THE COURT: But I get the point. And I can see
10	why 3M would say that should be released. I get that.
11	I'm just wondering about the practical meaning of that
12	because that seems like a fairly remote method by which
13	PFAS would get into wastewater or storm water.
14	MR. SUMMY: It's an extremely remote
15	hypothetical. But there's also the argument that, well,
16	and it's the one that I brought up earlier, where someone
17	can make an argument that drinking water gets into
18	wastewater by humans.
19	THE COURT: But that's been excluded.
20	MR. SUMMY: That's been excluded. And I will
21	tell you
22	THE COURT: And that was, by the way, something
23	that needed to be clarified.
24	MR. SUMMY: It needed to be clarified. And I
25	will say that Broward County raised another issue today,

which is, okay, so biosolids come out of the wastewater system. They're used on crops or on property or what have you. And then let's say that person, the property owner, sues the city because they sold them the fertilizer, or the biosolids, or they delivered it there. And when she suggested this change the first time, that brought about the interpretive guidance. I actually used that and 3M can attest to it.

THE COURT: She said you got the wrong I.

MR. SUMMY: Right. She said we have the wrong

I. But you have 11.1, which lays out a broad release.

And then 11.2 takes it away. And then the interpretive guidance, the one thing that I want to point out is is that Paragraph 2 not only takes it away but preserves your contribution and indemnity rights against 3M for that property owner. I made sure when we negotiated this that we put --

THE COURT: You need to explain that to me.

MR. SUMMY: Yes. Okay. So what happens is is you have the broad release. Then you have the carve outs, wastewater, storm water, as long as it's a separate facility. There are some facilities in America, not many, that are doing this toilet-to-tap situation.

THE COURT: I wouldn't want to drink any of that water.

MR. SUMMY: No, you would not. But if that's the same facility, that is released. But a separate physical facility is not released.

So let's say that a city sells biosolids to a farmer. And a farmer uses the biosolids as a fertilizer. Okay? But then he claims, well, it has PFAS in it. Let's say he sues the county or the city. The county or the city still has contribution and indemnity rights that flow from the carve out. I made sure when we negotiated this, I remember reading her objections, and when we went back to fix this, I said to 3M, you've got to put the contribution and indemnity rights back in for that scenario. So they did.

THE COURT: As unlikely as --

MR. SUMMY: As unlikely as it is, it's just that we didn't want people to be able to come in and argue, well, we could still be sued by this person even though it's coming from our wastewater. So I wanted to make sure that that got covered. So we put it into Paragraph 2 of the joint interpretive guidance that was filed after Broward County made their objections. But I want to give her credit for it. She helped me.

THE COURT: I thought her comments were really very interesting. I was following them.

MR. SUMMY: Right. She did help us understand

the issue better. And we did make this change to help address that.

Some of her other comments about what supervisors might say or not say, you know, those are tougher to change. Because, you know, there should be -- if they're concerned about that, they're going to have to issue a policy and tell people not to talk about it. But it's hard to change that in a bigger context of things.

But the issues that they have raised clearly fall back on the --

THE COURT: I thought -- I can understand it because I represented governments. I can understand you could say, oh, my God, I can get my people sued for violating the non-disparagement clause.

MR. SUMMY: Right.

THE COURT: First of all, I have some trouble imagining 3M wasting the time --

MR. SUMMY: I do, too.

THE COURT: -- to do it. But, you know, it's one of those things you've got to say, okay, there is a risk. You know, it is. And you've just got to balance that against the benefits because they are parts of the settlement that aren't perfect. There are things that 3M has insisted upon which, you know, if you had your way, you wouldn't have had it in there.

MR. SUMMY: That is correct. 1 2 THE COURT: But I get why the company would want 3 it in there. Right. Right. So, Your Honor, 4 MR. SUMMY: 5 that's our response to those objections. I have a few more responses I'd like to make --6 7 THE COURT: Please do. 8 MR. SUMMY: -- about just a few issues that 9 Mr. Kray raised. 10 THE COURT: I hope y'all are talking. 11 MR. SUMMY: We are. 12 THE COURT: I mean, I really -- I've now been 13 with Mr. Kray twice. And I'm kind of -- maybe I'm missing 14 something here, but I think he's trying to say, you know, 15 if y'all will work with me, I'm going to bring them back 16 in. 17 MR. SUMMY: Right. 18 THE COURT: I'm kind of hearing him say that. 19 MR. SUMMY: Right. 20 THE COURT: And I hope both you and 3M are 21 listening because there may be ways that are, you know, of 22 clarification that may make him feel more comfortable but 23 which don't do any real harm to anybody. 24 MR. SUMMY: Correct. 25 I was listening to a couple of those THE COURT:

Karen E. Martin, RMR, CRR
US District Court
District of South Carolina

and thinking about those.

MR. SUMMY: Right. And those discussions are ongoing. And, you know, some of it relates to whether or not, you know, folks really are going to come back in or is this an academic exercise. But those discussions are definitely going on.

But one of the things I wanted to cover is, you know, they keep coming back to the issue of -- they have cases against the federal government. And they don't like the claim-over provision.

THE COURT: Tell me about the claim over and its impact, how the claim-over provision would impact -- this was raised before by Mr. Kray. How the claim-over provision would potentially adversely affect the CERCLA claim down the road.

MR. SUMMY: So we don't think it does. What they're claiming is is that when they sue the federal government, federal government could bring 3M back in.

Jury could put, or judge, could put more liability on 3M. And 3M says we've already paid. We're protected by the claim-over provision. That's, in effect, how that works.

However, we think that that's highly academic and not real practical. But we also believe that we've looked at this a little bit since the last hearing. And if you look at a case called ENSF vs. The United States,

it's a 2009 US Supreme Court case, the only way they can really bring in 3M is under what's called arranger liability.

Well, under the current state of the law that is not going to work, the federal government bringing them in for contribution. Because the only way you can be held liable as an arranger -- and usually the attempt at this is to sue a seller of the product like 3M. The only way this works is if the seller had a specific intent in selling the product to dispose of a hazardous waste. They were selling fire foam that they truly believed saved lives and was a useful product. The Supreme Court clearly said if it's a seller selling a useful product, no liability. The current state of the law is it's going to be very difficult for the federal government to bring in 3M under arranger liability.

THE COURT: This is a third-party?

MR. SUMMY: It's a third-party claim.

THE COURT: So what you're talking about is and we're talking about primarily a CERCLA claim?

MR. SUMMY: Yes, I'm referring to a CERCLA claim.

THE COURT: Okay. So CERCLA claim isn't ripe yet because we haven't had these new regulations.

MR. SUMMY: That is correct. It's not in there

quite yet, but I think they're anticipating it's going to be in there.

THE COURT: And tell me how water districts may benefit from CERCLA, because I haven't gotten into that very much. Explain to me how that may be of some interest.

MR. SUMMY: This is such an interesting conversation because many of the water systems in many instances are contaminated by their own airport or their own fire training facility. So the CERCLA claim, they do not want to assert a CERCLA claim against themselves.

There is a bill that's pending before Congress now where some of the senators are trying to exempt airports, cities, and water providers from any CERCLA liability. And we're going to have to see how that plays out as legislation is making its way through.

But a lot of the CERCLA claims, unless it's against someone unrelated to the city, are not going to be made by the city because they could be suing themselves or a branch of themselves.

THE COURT: Of course, one of the dangers of this entire lawsuit is that everybody is suing everybody.

MR. SUMMY: That's correct.

THE COURT: And the MDL panel has been trying to avoid that so we don't just get a CERCLA firing squad.

1 MR. SUMMY: Correct. And that creates chaos. 2 And one additional thing to note about the claim-over 3 provisions that we've looked at is we took a deep dive on 4 There are 46 states that severely limit the the law. 5 ability to seek contribution against a settling party. THE COURT: South Carolina is one of those 6 7 states. 8 MR. SUMMY: Yes, and so is the State of 9 Washington, which has a bar against contribution against a 10 settling party which is -- the objection's being raised by 11 Vancouver. 12 THE COURT: That's why all this noise about the 13 claims-over provision, most contribution statutes prevent 14 it anyway. 15 MR. SUMMY: They do. They absolutely do. 16 wanted to make sure the record was complete with the law 17 on these items because I don't believe the class members 18 who are suing the federal government have a ton to worry 19 about when it comes to the claim-over provision against 20 the manufacturers of the product. 21 THE COURT: Well, there's much unknown, right, 22 in the future? 23 MR. SUMMY: That's correct. 24 THE COURT: And at some point, you've got to 25 make an educated judgment about your tolerance for risk.

MR. SUMMY: That's correct. 1 2 THE COURT: Right? I mean, that's what you have 3 There's no risk-free environment here. to do. MR. SUMMY: That's correct. 4 5 THE COURT: You can say I'm opting out and I'll catch up with 3M in my district court. And you may find 6 7 out you're an unsecured creditor, right? 8 MR. SUMMY: That is correct. 9 THE COURT: I mean, so it's not a risk free --10 there's just no -- or you might have a statute of 11 limitations problem. You might not even have 3M in your 12 home water district. I mean, you know, it's just -- it is 13 so much uncertainty out there that if you're looking for 14 an island to anchor yourself, the only anchor I see, the 15 only island I see is the settlement. 16 MR. SUMMY: That is correct. 17 THE COURT: Everything else is uncertain. 18 let me say, some of the these objectors and opt-outs, they 19 may be right. I always feared in a complicated settlement 20 that the risk was something we hadn't even thought about 21 yet. 22 MR. SUMMY: Right. 23 THE COURT: That you wouldn't even see it 24 coming. 25 MR. SUMMY: Correct.

108

1 THE COURT: Everybody worked on all these risks 2 but it was the one we didn't think about that was actually 3 the potential -- so there's just no way to do it all. 4 can sort it out. You can define exactly what your 5 settlement agreement is. And at some point, you've got to say it isn't perfect. But are the imperfections too great 6 7 for me to accept the settlement? 8 MR. SUMMY: Correct. 9 THE COURT: I mean, I think that's where 10 everybody's got to end up. 11 I think that's right, Your Honor. MR. SUMMY: 12 **THE COURT:** One way or the other. Mr. Kray 13 raised, I thought, a clear question about, you know, sort 14 of the noise that somehow they'd be committing malpractice 15 by doing this. You know, I think the ones who commit 16 malpractice are the ones who don't do due diligence. 17 MR. SUMMY: I think that's right, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: If you do due diligence, I can see a 19 judgment. I'm not sure I'd reach the same conclusion, but 20 I can see that reasonable people might say, particularly 21 if they don't have any PFAS right now. 22 MR. SUMMY: Correct. 23 THE COURT: I can see them -- you know, Phase 24 Two, I can see that. 25 MR. SUMMY: That's correct.

1 THE COURT: But Phase One is the one that gets 2 me a little confused unless you've got a really strong 3 argument. You've got money on the table. Right. And I think what Mr. Douglas 4 MR. SUMMY: 5 was referring to is like you said, Your Honor, it's the lawyers who are not looking at, hey, can I even prove 6 7 product ID? Hey, have I violated the statute of 8 limitations already? Hey, do I have a statute of repose 9 problem? It's that kind of thing. There are clearly 10 lawyers that are involved here that have done due 11 diligence, like Mr. Kray with his clients, and who have 12 looked at it from these angles and have made a decision to opt-out. And that's fine. That's certainly within their 13 14 right. But I think Mr. Douglas is talking about some of 15 the others that have these issues. 16 THE COURT: Yeah. Mr. Kray in the Dupont 17 settlement was describing the potential CERCLA claim and 18 his concern about it. 19 MR. SUMMY: Correct. 20 THE COURT: And, you know, I've looked a little 21 bit at it. I kind of wouldn't have had as much concern as

MR. SUMMY: That's correct.

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he had.

THE COURT: I mean, you talk about any time you're litigating against the federal government gets

But I can't tell him he's free from that.

everyone sleepy really fast. Right? It's very complicated.

MR. SUMMY: That's correct. But, Your Honor, the long and short of it, at the end of the day, and I think this is -- we've talked about this. You've said it. Certainly, the Third Circuit in NFL Concussion has said it, which is you can't let the perfect be the enemy of the good.

And yes, this settlement is not perfect. But at the end of the day, it is awfully good. It really is and because of what it's going to do for class members and the people of this country. And it's creative. It's multi-facetted. Its timing is impeccable. And our belief is is that, yes, while it's going to help clean up the drinking water of America, the beneficiaries of this settlement are the individuals that live in this country whose public health will be impacted by the cleanup. And that is going to go on for generations. And it really is a settlement that is fair, reasonable, and adequate. I think we've portrayed that here today. We have done everything we know to do to protect these class members. And we think that this settlement should be approved consistent with our motion.

And with that, I will close. And I will let

Mr. Klonoff make his comments and we'll be done from our

side.

2 THE COURT: Very good.

Professor, good to see you again.

PROFESSOR KLONOFF: Good to see you again, Your Honor. I am honored to offer my perspective in support of this settlement. I do so as someone who has focused almost exclusively on class actions in MDLs for the last 35 years as an attorney, expert witness, teacher, and scholar. I've been involved in a number of high profile cases. And my responsibility for the three class action volumes of Wright and Miller gives me a unique historical perspective.

As I said last time in connection with Dupont, these are historic settlements, among a handful of the most significant settlements in history. What do I mean by historic? Earlier this week, I was discussing this very issue and this very case in my complex litigation class. Forty talented students who dream about a career in complex litigation, and we explored this precise question. We discussed the fact that most major settlements benefit a discrete group, not the broader public.

For example, the NFL Concussion case, which we've mentioned today, it benefited retired football players. Automobile defect cases benefit those who happen

to own the particular kind of vehicle. Securities fraud cases benefit individuals who own the particular stock.

This case is different. Yes, it benefits the thousands of class members here. But in reality, it benefits the entire country, many millions of individuals.

THE COURT: Because the class members serve the public.

PROFESSOR KLONOFF: Exactly. That is exactly right. And Your Honor, with all of my experience, I am not aware of another civil lawsuit that can boast a comparable impact.

THE COURT: Let me add this. You know, when this case started, this whole PFAS issue was like a footnote. People didn't really appreciate it. When the MDL panel called me to get involved, they had to explain to me what the issue was. I was like, what is this all about? If only they had told me 20,000 plaintiffs, I might have said I'm busy.

But, you know, the part of the beneficial effects of this lawsuit has been to inform the public and the public health people about the risks of this contamination, this toxicity. Plainly, it has informed the regulatory efforts to expand attention and regulation of this particular chemical. So it's not only has been to the benefit through the fact that American consumers

consume water, and the water they're going -- these settlement funds will go to remediation. It is they have informed. They have helped educate and inform the public about this problem. And to me that is, like, one of the highest callings of the law, which is to in its efforts to do justice is to do justice broadly.

PROFESSOR KLONOFF: You are absolutely right,
Your Honor. This has been an incredible educational case
for the public. And that is one of the many benefits of
this litigation.

THE COURT: And let me say this. I'm sure some of the law partners of some of these plaintiff lawyers thought they had lost their minds. And \$20 million later, they probably really thought this thing better come out better. And it has. But, you know, they will reap the benefit of having done some real public good.

PROFESSOR KLONOFF: Exactly. There have been some objections and opt-outs here, but the numbers are small. Under the case law, this means that the overwhelming majority of class members approve the settlement, as they should.

In some settlements, such as small-dollar consumer cases, one could argue that the absence of objections or opt-outs may not mean that much. There is too little at stake, for example, to object or opt-out in

a consumer case because you believe you should get ten dollars instead of five dollars.

THE COURT: Or a dollar.

PROFESSOR KLONOFF: But in this multi-billion dollar settlement involving very sophisticated class members and lots of money at stake, the small number of objections and opt-outs is compelling. The objections that have been lodged focus mainly on the release. And I want to make two points in that regard.

First, having represented many Fortune 500 companies in class action, I can attest that companies will not write big checks unless they get broad releases. This concept is often referred to as global peace. Not surprisingly, cases in the Fourth Circuit and elsewhere have approved releases much broader than those here, especially when the class is being well compensated.

Second, it is easy to object and say, sweeten the deal, make it better. But the reality is that the settlement process is not a blank check. Class counsel, with the capable assistance of the mediator, have negotiated the best possible deal. And it is simply unrealistic to believe that 3M will agree to any additional concessions.

THE COURT: You know, Professor, the major objection I heard, which I think contributes to a number

of the opt-outs, is that it isn't enough. You know?

We've got big problems and this doesn't solve them a

hundred percent. And we're going to go out and we're

going to try to solve our problem. And to me, that's a

little bit of a silo view of this. Because if someone had

come in, and I know these two objectors didn't make these

points, I would have asked, well, how much should it have

been? If up to 12.5 billion isn't enough, what -- how

much?

And then I would have asked, well, what is the capacity of this company to pay more? It's not like all the claims against 3M have expired. They're -- I'm right now working up the leach cases. They've got the other personal injury cases. We've got property claims. We've got sovereign claims. We've got things out there we've got to manage. So how much more do they anticipate could be obtained from this defendant before the defendant just throws the towel into the middle of the ring? I mean, really.

And, you know, it's easy to sit on the outside and say they should have done more. Right? But it reminds me of the old President Kennedy did a bullfight critics fill the stadium full but only the bullfighter faces the bull. Right? And, you know, these guys have faced the bull, you know. And they've made a judgment.

Could they have gotten a dollar more? I don't know. I always thought if I stuck around in a settlement for my last dollar was when I got greedy, what's the old line, pigs eat and hogs get eaten.

PROFESSOR KLONOFF: That is totally the reality.

I mean, from my work on the defense side hearing clients say, look, I'm not giving a penny more, and we'll just litigate them one by one.

I mean, I am convinced from the process, from the quality of the lawyering on the both sides, from the mediator involvement that this is the best settlement.

And the idea, sure, you can ask for more, but it's unrealistic.

And that really brings me to the next point about the opt-outs and the people who are thinking about coming back on board. We've talked a lot about that today. And I really think that's an important issue. And I really think the opt-outs who are thinking about coming back in should do so.

You don't want to go it alone against these well represented companies potentially for decades as we've pointed out. You don't want to face a host of defenses, such as statute of limitations and causations, defenses that do not apply to those who join the settlement.

So I really, really support the Court's comments

about the people who are thinking about opting out to really, really think hard about what they're giving up.

This is an extraordinary settlement.

And I want to reiterate what I said last time about why this settlement came to be. I've mentioned the capable, diligent, and aggressive defense counsel. The vigorous, thorough, and creative class counsel. Frankly, some of the best I've ever worked with on the plaintiff's side. And I've worked with --

THE COURT: Don't butter them up too much.

They've already got a pretty big head.

PROFESSOR KLONOFF: That is true. Top notch mediators and especially this Court, as I said last time, whose extraordinary management of this litigation was absolutely instrumental in achieving this settlement. And all of those points that I made last time apply equally to the 3M settlement.

I want to make one final thought. There is considerable cynicism in this country regarding our civil justice system. I hear it all the time. I heard it repeatedly during my six years of service on the federal civil rules committee. I hear it frequently from other law professors. And this cynicism is especially notable when I speak internationally, especially in Europe and Asia where US-style class actions are viewed with great

1	skepticism.
2	This litigation showcases our civil justice
3	system at its best. And everyone involved in this process
4	should be proud. In the end, all of the objections fall
5	flat. As this Court said last time and reiterated today,
6	we cannot let the perfect be the enemy of the good.
7	I urge the Court to find that the settlement is
8	fair, reasonable, and adequate. Thank you.
9	THE COURT: Thank you.
10	Okay. Is there anything further we need to hear
11	from the class counsel?
12	MR. SUMMY: Nothing further, Your Honor.
13	THE COURT: From defense?
14	MR. BULGER: Nothing further, Your Honor.
15	THE COURT: Very good.
16	With this, I will take the matter under
17	advisement and this hearing is adjourned. Thank you.
18	MR. DOUGLAS: Thank you, Your Honor.
19	MR. LONDON: Thank you, Your Honor.
20	(WHEREUPON, court was adjourned at 1:49 PM.)
21	* * *
22	I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from
23	the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
24	s/Karen E. Martin 2/2/2024
25	Karen E. Martin, RMR, CRR Date